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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 
CHAPTER 6 
TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Article 1 




41-6-1.5. Private vehicle as 
vehicle - Rules. 
41-6-2 to 41-6-10. Repealed. 
emergency 
Article 2 














Chapter relates to vehicles on 
highways - Exceptions. 
Violation of chapter - Class B 
misdemeanor, unless speci-
fied. 
Obedience to peace officer or 
other traffic controllers. 
Failure to respond to officer's 
signal to stop - Fleeing -
Traveling at excessive speeds 
or causing property damage 
or bodily injury - Penalties. 
Emergency vehicles - Applica-
bility of traffic law to high-
way work vehicles - Exemp-
tions. 
Persons riding or driving ani-
mals subject to chapter. 
Uniform application of chapter 
- Effect of local ordinances. 
Regulatory powers of local au-
thorities -Traffic-control de-
vice affecting state highway 
- Necessity of erecting traf-
fic-control devices. 
Private roads and parking 
areas. 
Right of real property owner to 
regulate traffic. 
Removal of plants or other ob-
structions impairing view -
Notice to owner - Penalty. 
Repealed. 
Article 3 
Traffic Signs, Signals and Markings 
41-6-20. 
41-6-21. 
Manual and specifications for 
uniform system of traffic-con-
trol devices. 
Placing and maintenance upon 
state highways - Restric-













Placing and maintenance upon 
local highways by local au-
thorities. 
Obeying devices - Effect of im-
proper position, illegibility, 
or absence - Presumption of 
lawful placement and compli-
ance with chapter. 
Traffic-control signal - At in-
tersections - At place other 
than intersection - Color of 
light signal. 
Special pedestrian-control sig-
nals - Meaning of signals -
Rights and duties. 
Flashing red or yellow signals 
- Rights and duties of opera-
tors - Railroad grade cross-
ings excluded. 
Lane use control signals -
Colors. 
Prohibition of unauthorized 
signs, signals, lights or mark-
ings - Commercial advertis-
ing - Public nuisance - Re-
moval. 




Operator's duty at accident -
Stop at accident - Penalty. 
Accidents involving damage to 
vehicle or property - Stop at 
accident. 
Accident involving mJury, 
death, or property damage -
Duties of operator, occupant, 
or owner. 
41-6-32. Collision with unattended vehi-
cle or other property - Du-
ties of operator. 
41-6-33, 41-6-34. Repealed. 
41-6-35. Accident reports - Duty of op-
erator and investigative offi-
cer to forward or render. 
41-6-35.5. Vehicle accidents - Investiga-
tion and report of operator se-
curity - Agency action if no 
security Surrender of 












Accident reports - Forms -
Contents - Penalties for fail-
ure to make report. 
Livestock on highway - Re-
strictions - Collision, action 
for damages. 
Peace officer investigating acci-
dent to notify owner if live-
stock or broken fence in-
volved - Exempt from liabil-
ity. 
Garage keeper to report dam-
aged vehicle without damage 
sticker. 
Accident reports - When confi-
dential - Insurance policy 
information - Use as evi-
dence - Penalty for false in-
formation. 
Statistical information regard-
ing accidents - Annual pub-
lication. 
Local powers to require report. 
Article 5 











Local DUI and related ordi-




Driving under the influence of 
alcohol or drug or with speci-
fied or unsafe blood alcohol 
concentration - Measure-
ment of blood or breath alco-
hol - Criminal punishment 
- Arrest without warrant -
Penalties - Suspension or 
revocation of license. 
Procedures - Adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
Repealed. 
Standards for chemical breath 
analysis - Evidence. 
Admissibility of chemical test 
results in actions for driving 
under the influence 
Weight of evidence. 
Municipal attorneys for speci-
fied offenses may prosecute 
for driving while license sus-
pended or revoked. 
Implied consent to chemical 
tests for alcohol or drug -
Number of tests - Refusal -
Warning, report - Hearing, 
revocation of license - Ap-
peal - Person incapable of 













available - Who may give 
test - Evidence. 
Drinking alcoholic beverage 
and open containers in motor 
vehicle prohibited - Defini-
tions - Exceptions. 
Seizure and impoundment of 
vehicles by peace officers -
Impound requirements - Re-
moval of vehicle by owner. 
Reckless driving - Penalty. 
Article 6 
Speed Restrictions 
Speed regulations - Safe and 
appropriate speeds at certain 
locations - Prima facie speed 
limits - Emergency power of 
the governor. 
Prima facie speed limit. 
Speed restrictions - Powers of 
local authorities - Posted 
speed. 
Minimum speed regulations. 
Special speed limit on bridges 
- Prima facie evidence. 
Speed contest or exhibition on 
highway - Barricade or ob-
struction. 




Regulations Applicable to Driv-
ing on Right Side of Highway, 
Overtaking, Passing and 











Duty to operate vehicle on right 
side of roadway - Excep-
tions. 
Passing vehicles proceeding in 
opposite directions. 
Overtaking and passing vehi-
cles proceeding in same direc-
tion. 
Passing upon right - When 
permissible. 
Limitation on passing - Prohi-
bitions. 
Limitations on driving on left 
side of road - Exceptions. 
Signs and markings on road-
way - No passing zones -
Exceptions. 
One-way traffic. 
Roadway divided into marked 
lanes - Provisions - Traffic-
control devices. 
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Following another vehicle -
Safe distance - Caravan or 
motorcade - Exception for 
funeral procession. 
Repealed. 
Divided highway - Use of 
right-hand side - Crossing 
only where permitted. 
Controlled-access highways -
Driving onto and from high-
ways where permitted. 
Controlled-access highways -
Prohibiting use by class or 
kind of traffic - Traffic-con-
trol devices. 
Article 8 
Turns and Signals on Start-
ing, Stopping or Turning 







Turning around - Where pro-
hibited - Visibility. 
Moving a vehicle - Safety. 
Turning or changing lanes -
Safety - Signals - Stopping 
or sudden decrease in speed 
- Signal flashing - Where 
prohibited. 
Signals - Methods. 
Signals - How made. 
Article 9 
Right-of-Way 
41-6-72. Unregulated intersection 
Right-of-way between vehi-
cles. 
41-6-72.10. Right-of-way - Stop or yield 
signals - Yield - Collisions 
at intersections or junctions 
of roadways - Evidence. 
41-6-73. Vehicle turning left - Yield 
right-of-way. 
41-6-74, 41-6-74.10. Repealed. 




other than from another 
roadway - Yield right-of-
way. 
Merging lanes - Yielding. 
Emergency vehicle - Neces-
sary signals - Duties of re-
spective drivers. 
Vehicle or pedestrian working 
upon _ highway - Right-of-
way. 
Article 10 
Pedestrians' Rights and Duties 
41-6-77. Pedestrians subject to traffic-















Duty of pedestrian. 
Pedestrians yielding right-of-
way - Limits on pedestrians. 
Emergency vehicle - Neces-
sary signals - Duties of oper-
ator - Pedestrian to yield. 
Passing closed railroad or 
bridge gate or barrier prohib-
ited. 
Vehicles to exercise due care to 
avoid pedestrians - Audible 
signals and caution. 
Operators to yield right-of-way 
to blind pedestrian - Duties 
of blind pedestrian - Use of 
cane - Failure to yield - Li-
ability. 
Vehicle crossing sidewalk -
Operator to yield. 
Repealed. 
Use of roadway by pedestrians 
- Prohibited activities. 
Unmarked crosswalk locations 
- Restrictions on pedestrian. 
Pedestrian vehicles. 
Article 11 












Parents and guardians may not 
authorize child's violation of 
chapter. 
Bicycle and moped riders sub-
ject to chapter - Exception. 
Carrying more persons than de-
sign permits prohibited -
Exception. 
Persons on bicycles, mopeds, 
skates, and sleds not to at-
tach to moving vehicles -
Exception. 
Operation of bicycle or moped 
on and use of roadway - Du-
ties, prohibitions. 
Bicycles to yield right-of-way to 
pedestrians on sidewalk -
Where use of sidewalk pro-
hibited - Same laws as for 
pedestrians. 
Bicycles - Parking on side-
walk, roadway - Prohibi-
tions. 
Bicycles and mopeds - Turns 
- Designated lanes. 
Bicycles and mopeds - Turn 
signals. 
Bicycle and moped inspections 
- At request of officer. 
Bicycle racing - When ap-






ceptions - Authorized ex-
emptions from traffic laws. 
Bicycles and mopeds - Carry-
ing bundle - One hand on 
handlebars. 
Section 
41-6-104. Stopping or parking upon road-
ways - Angle parking -
Traffic-control devices pro-
hibiting or restricting. 
Article 15 41-6-89. 
41-6-90. 
Bicycle - Prohibited equip-
ment - Brakes required. 
Bicycles - Lamps and reflec-
tive material required. 
Miscellaneous Rules 
Article 12 
Railroad Trains and Safety Zones 
41-6-91, 41-6-92. Repealed. 
41-6-93. Driving on tracks. 









Special Stops Required 
Railroad grade crossing - Duty 
to stop - Driving through, 
around or under gate or bar-
rier prohibited. 
Trains - Interference with ve-
hicles limited. 
Repealed. 
Railroad grade crossings 
Certain vehicles must stop -
Exceptions - Regulations. 
Duties respecting crawler type 
tractor, power shovel, derrick 
or other equipment or struc-
ture. 
Designation of through high-
ways - Stop signs, yield 
signs and traffic-control de-
vices - Designation of inter-
sections as locations for pref-
erential right-of-way treat-
ment. 
Vehicles emerging from alleys, 
buildings, private roads or 
driveways must stop prior to 
sidewalk area or street. 
41-6-100.10. School bus - Signs and light 
signals - Flashing amber 
lights - Flashing red lights 
- Passing school bus - Duty 
to stop - Travel in opposite 
direction. 
Article 14 




Stopping or parking on road-
way outside business or resi-
dential district. 
Police officer authorized to 
move vehicle. 
Standing or parking vehicles -























Motor vehicle left unattended 
- Requirements. 
Backing - When permissible. 
Sidewalk - Driving prohibited 
- Exception. 
Motorcycle or motor-driven cy-
cle - Place for operator to 
ride - Passengers. 
Motorcycles, motor-driven cy-
cles, or all-terrain type I vehi-
cles - Operation on public 
highways. 
Motorcycle or motor-driven cy-
cle - Attaching to another 
vehicle prohibited. 
Motorcycle or motor-driven cy-
cle - Footrests for passenger 
- Height of handlebars lim-
ited. 
Motorcycle or motor-driven cy-
cle - Protective headgear -
Closed cab excepted - Speci-
fications and standards. 
Prohibition as to passenger rid-
ing on improper portion of 
motor vehicle - Exceptions. 
Vehicle door - Prohibited 
opening. 
Obstruction to driver's view or 
driving mechanism. 
Occupancy of house trailer 
while being moved on high-
way prohibited. 
Entering intersection, cross-
walk or railroad grade - Suf-
ficient space required. 
Driving in canyons and on 
mountain highways. 
Coasting prohibited. 
Following fire apparatus or 
parking near prohibited. 
Driving over firehose. 
Destructive or injurious mate-
rials on highways, parks, rec-
reation areas, waterways or 
other public or private lands 
- Throwing lighted material 
from moving vehicle - En-
forcement officers - Litter 
receptacles required. 
Violation - Penalty. 
Warning signs. 
School buses - Regulations re-
garding design and operation. 









Violation ofregulations - Pen-
alty. 
Abandoned vehicles - Police 
officer removing - Report -
Procedure if not reclaimed. 
Article 16 
Equipment 
Operation of unsafe or improp-
erly equipped vehicles on 
public highways - Excep-
tions. 
Permit to operate vehicle in vio-
lation of equipment regula-
tions. 
Lights and illuminating devices 
- Duty to display - Time. 
Motor vehicle head lamp re-
quirements. 
Tail lamps - Illumination of 
rear registration plate - Re-
flectors. 
41-6-121. Repealed. 
41-6-121.10. Stop lamps required - Supple-
mental stop lamps - Turn 
41-6-122. 
signals. 
Additional lamps and reflec-
tors. 
41-6-123 to 41-6-126. Repealed. 













Load extending beyond rear of 
vehicle - Duty to display 
lamps and reflectors or flag. 
Parking lamps required - Use 
when vehicle parked at night 
- Head lamps dimmed. 
Farm tractors and equipment 
- Lamps and reflectors -
Slow-moving vehicle emblem. 
Lamps and reflectors on vehi-
cles not otherwise specified -
Slow-moving vehicle em-
blems on animal-drawn vehi-
cles. 
Spot lamps. 
Emergency vehicles - Flash-
ing lights - Rotating lights. 
Warning lamps. 
Back-up lamps - Side-marker 
lamps. 
Repealed. 
Lamp required for operation of 
vehicle on roadway or adja-
cent shoulder - Dimming of 
lights. 
Head lamps on farm tractors -
Motor vehicles sold prior to 
certain date. 
























Requirements for slow-moving 
vehicles. 
Repealed. 
Number of front lamps required 
and permitted. 
High intensity beams - Red 
lights - Flashing lights -
Color of rear lights and re-
flectors. 
Standards and specifications for 
lighting and special warning 
devices on school buses. 
Highway construction and 
maintenance vehicles 
'I'ransportation department 
to adopt rules for lighting. 
Sale or use of unapproved light-
ing equipment or devices pro-
hibited. 
Sale of unapproved lighting and 
other equipment prohibited. 
Department to adopt standards 
for lights and other equip-
ment - Compliance with fed-
eral standards - Trademark 
or brand name. 
Departmental approval of light-
ing devices or safety equip-
ment. 
Departmental hearings - Com-
pliance of approved devices -
Revocation of approval - Re-
approval. 
Purchase and testing of equip-
ment by department - Pro-
hibition against sale of sub-
standard devices - Injunc-
tion - Review - Appeal. 
Braking systems required -
Adoption of performance re-
quirements by department. 
Horns and warning devices -
Emergency vehicles. 
Mufflers - Prevention of noise, 
smoke and fumes - Air pol-
lution control devices. 
Mirrors. 
Seat belts - Design and instal-
lation - Specifications or re-
quirements. 
Child restraint device required 
- Violation as infraction -
Dismissal of charge - Fail-
ure not admissible as to neg-
ligence. 
Vehicles subject to Sections 
41-6-148.29 through 
41-6-148.33 - Definitions. 
Repealed. 





























Safety chains on towed vehicles 
required - Exceptions. 
Windshields and windows -
Obstructions reducing visibil-
ity - Wipers. 
Tires which are prohibited -
Regulatory powers of state 
transportation department -
Winter use of studs - Special 
permits - Tread depth. 
Guards or flaps at rear wheels 




Flares, fusees or electric lan-
terns and flags-Alternative 
reflector units - Duty to 
carry in trucks and buses -
Requirements. 
Warning signal around dis-
abled vehicle - Time and 
place. 
Hazardous' materials - Trans-
portation regulations - Fire 
extinguishers. 
Air conditioning equipment -
Requirements. 
Television receivers in motor 
vehicles prohibited if driver 
can see viewing screen - Ex-
ception. 
Motorcycles - Required equip-
ment - Brakes. 
Vehicles and equipment must 
be in safe mechanical condi-
tion. 
Inspection by officers - Certifi-
cate of inspection. 
Enforcement of inspection re-
quirements. 
Inspection required - Inspec-
tion certificate required. 
Suspension of registration. 
Official inspection stations 
Fees - Permits - Suspen-
sion or revocation - Utah-
based interstate commercial 
motor carriers. 
Hearing board created - Mem-
bers - Term - Meetings -
Adjudicative proceedings. 
Permits not transferable 
Certificate of inspection 
Fees. 



















Counterfeit certificates of in-
spection. 
Emissions inspection - Auto-
matic repealer. 
Emissions inspection - County 
program. 
Violation of act - Misde-
meanor. 
Violation of chapter. 
Requiring or knowingly permit-
ting driver to unlawfully op-
erate vehicle. 
Government-owned 
subject to chapter. 
vehicles 
Appearance upon arrest for 
misdemeanor Setting 
bond. 
Notice to appear in court -
Contents - Promise to com-
ply - Signing - Release 
from custody - Official mis-
conduct. 
Violation of promise to appear 
as misdemeanor - Appear-
ance by counsel. 
Arrests without warrants. 
Repealed. 
Record of violation not admissi-
ble in civil action. 
Conviction shall not affect cred-
ibility as a witness. 
Improper disposition or cancel-
lation of notice to appear or 
traffic citation - Official 
misconduct - Misdemeanor. 
Keeping of records - Making 
and forwarding of abstract 
upon conviction or forfeiture 
of bail - Form and contents 
- Public inspection - Offi. 
cial misconduct. 
Repealed. 
Short title of act. 
41-6-174. 
41-6-175. 
41-6-175.5. Conflict with Federal Motor 
Carrier Safety Regulations. 
41-6-176 to 41-6-180. Repealed. 
Article 17 
Motor Vehicle Seat Belt Usage 
41-6-181. Short title. 








Penalty for violation. 
Compliance - Civil litigation. 
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ARTICLE 1 
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS 
41-6-1. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
41-6-1 
(1) "Alley" means a street or highway intended to provide access to the 
rear or side of lots or buildings in urban districts and not intended for 
through vehicular traffic. 
(2) "All-terrain type I vehicle" is used as defined in Section 41-22-2. 
(3) "Authorized emergency vehicle" means fire department vehicles, 
police vehicles, ambulances, and other publicly or privately owned vehi-
cles as designated by the commissioner of the Department of Public 
Safety. 
(4) "Bicycle" means every device propelled by human power upon 
which any person may ride, having two tandem wheels, except scooters 
and similar devices. 
(5) "Bus" means every motor vehicle designed for carrying more than 
15 passengers and used for the transportation of persons; and every motor 
vehicle, other than a taxicab, designed and used for the transportation of 
persons for compensation. 
(6) "Controlled-access highway" means every highway, street, or road-
way to or from which owners or occupants of abutting lands and other 
persons have no legal right of access, except at points as determined by 
the public authority having jurisdiction over the highway, street, or road-
way. 
(7) "Crosswalk" means: 
(a) that part of a roadway at an intersection included within the 
connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of 
the highway measured from the curbs or, in the absence of curbs, 
from the edges of the traversable roadway; and in the absence of a 
sidewalk on one side of the roadway, that part of a roadway included 
within the extension of the lateral lines of the existing sidewalk at 
right angles to the centerline; or 
(b) any portion of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere dis-
tinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings 
on the surface. 
(8) "Department" means the Department of Public Safety. 
(9) "Divided highway" means a highway divided into two or more road-
ways by unpaved intervening space or by a physical barrier or by a 
clearly indicated dividing section constructed to impede vehicular traffic. 
(10) "Explosives" means any chemical compound or mechanical mix-
ture commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing an explosion 
and which contains any oxidizing and combustive units or other ingredi-
ents in proportions, quantities, or packing so that an ignition by fire, 
friction, concussion, percussion, or detonator of any part of the compound 
or mixture may cause a sudden generation of highly heated gases, and the 
resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects 
on contiguous objects or of causing death or serious bodily injury. 
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(11) "Farm tractor" means every motor vehicle designed and used pri-
marily as a farm implement, for drawing plows, mowing machines, and 
other implements of husbandry. 
(12) "Flammable liquid" means any liquid which has a flashpoint of 
100 degrees F. or less, as determined by a tagliabue or equivalent closed-
cup test device. 
(13) "Gross weight" means the weight of a vehicle without load plus 
the weight of any load on the vehicle. 
(14) "Highway" means the entire width between property lines of every 
way or place of any nature when any part of it is open to the use of the 
public as a matter of right for vehicular travel. 
(15) "Intersection" means the area embraced within the prolongation 
or connection of the lateral curblines, or, if none, then the lateral bound-
ary lines of the roadways of two or more highways whichjoin one another. 
Where a highway includes two roadways 30 feet or more apart, every 
crossing of each roadway of the divided highway by an intersecting high-
way is a separate intersection; if the intersecting highway also includes 
two roadways 30 feet or more apart, then every crossing of two roadways 
of the highways is a separate intersection. 
The junction of an alley with a street or highway is not an intersection. 
(16) "Local authorities" means every county, municipal, and other local 
board or body having authority to enact laws relating to traffic under the 
constitution and laws of the state. 
(17) "Metal tire" means a tire, the surface of which in contact with the 
highway is wholly or partly of metal or other hard nonresilient material. 
(18) "Mobile home" means: 
(a) a trailer or semitrailer which is designed, constructed, and 
equipped as a dwelling place, living abode, or sleeping place either 
permanently or temporarily, and is equipped for use as a conveyance 
on streets and highways; or 
(b) a trailer or a semitrailer whose chassis and exterior shell is 
designed and constructed for use as a mobile home, as defined in 
Subsection (a), but which is instead used permanently or temporarily 
for the advertising, sales, display, or promotion of merchandise or 
services, or for any other commercial purpose except the transporta-
tion of property for hire or the transportation of property for distribu-
tion by a private carrier. 
(19) "Moped" means a motor-driven cycle having both pedals to permit 
propulsion by human power, and a motor which produces not more than 
two brake horsepower and which is not capable of propelling the cycle at a 
speed in excess of 30 miles per hour on level ground. If an internal com-
bustion engine is used, the displacement may not exceed 50 cubic centi-
meters and the moped shall have a power drive system that functions 
directly or automatically without clutching or shifting by the operator 
after the drive system is engaged. 
(20) "Motor vehicle" means every vehicle which is self-propelled and 
every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead 
trolley wires, but not operated upon rails, except vehicles moved solely by 
human power and motorized wheel chairs. 
(21) "Motorcycle" means every motor vehicle, other than a tractor, hav-
ing a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel with not 
more than three wheels in contact with the ground. 
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(22) "Motor-driven cycle" means every motorcycle and motor scooter, 
and every motorized bicycle having an engine with less than 150 cubic 
centimeters displacement or having a motor which produces not more 
than five horsepower. 
(23) "Official traffic-control devices" means all signs, signals, mark-
ings, and devices not inconsistent with this chapter placed or erected by 
authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the purpose of 
regulating, warning, or guiding traffic. 
(24) "Off-highway implement of husbandry" is used as defined under 
Section 41-22-2. 
(25) "Off-highway vehicle" is used as defined under Section 41-22-2. 
(26) "Operator" means any person who is in actual physical control of a 
vehicle. 
(27) "Park" or "parking" means the standing of a vehicle, whether 
occupied or not, otherwise than temporarily for the purpose of and while 
actually engaged in loading or unloading property or passengers. 
(28) "Peace officer" means every law enforcement officer authorized 
under Section 77-la-1 to direct or regulate traffic or to make arrests for 
violations of traffic laws. 
(29) "Pedestrian" means any person afoot. 
(30) "Person" means every natural person, firm, copartnership, associ-
ation, or corporation. 
(31) "Pole trailer" means every vehicle without motive power designed 
to be drawn by another vehicle and attached to the towing vehicle by 
means of a reach, or pole, or by being boomed or otherwise secured to the 
towing vehicle, and is ordinarily used for transporting long or irregular 
shaped loads such as poles, pipes, or structural members generally capa-
ble of sustaining themselves as beams between the supporting connec-
tions. 
(32) "Private road or driveway" means every way or place in private 
ownership and used for vehicular travel by the owner and those having 
express or implied permission from the owner, but not by other persons. 
(33) "Railroad" means a carrier of persons or property upon cars oper-
ated upon stationary rails. 
(34) "Railroad sign or signal" means a sign, signal, or device erected by 
authority of a public body or official or by a railroad and intended to give 
notice of the presence of railroad tracks or the approach of a railroad 
train. 
(35) "Railroad train" means a locomotive propelled by any form of en-
ergy, coupled with or operated without cars, and operated upon rails. 
(36) "Right-of-way" means the right of one vehicle or pedestrian to 
proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another vehicle or pedestrian 
approaching under circumstances of direction, speed, and proximity 
which give rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the 
other. 
(37) "Roadway" means that portion of highway improved, designed, or 
ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the sidewalk, berm, or 
shoulder, even though any of them are used by persons riding bicycles or 
other human-powered vehicles. If a highway includes two or more sepa-
rate roadways, roadway refers to any roadway separately but not to all 
roadways collectively. 
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(38) "Safety zone" means the area or space officially set apart within a 
roadway for the exclusive use of pedestrians and which is protected, 
marked, or indicated by adequate signs as to be plainly visible at all 
times while set apart as a safety zone. 
(39) "School bus" means every motor vehicle that complies with the 
color and identification requirements of the most recent edition of "Mini• 
mum Standards for School Buses" and is used to transport school children 
to or from school or school activities. This definition does not include 
vehicles operated by common carriers in transportation of school children 
to or from school or school activities. 
(40) "Semitrailer" means a vehicle with or without motive power, other 
than a pole trailer, designed for carrying persons or property and for 
being drawn by a motor vehicle, and constructed so that some part of its 
weight and that of its load rests upon or is carried by another vehicle. 
(41) "Shoulder area" means that area of the hard-surfaced highway 
separated from the roadway by a pavement edge line as established in the 
current approved "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices," or that 
portion of the road contiguous to the roadway for accommodation of 
stopped vehicles, for emergency use, and lateral support. 
( 42) "Sidewalk" means that portion of a street between the curb lines, 
or the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent property lines intended 
for the use of pedestrians. 
( 43) "Solid rubber tire" means every tire of rubber or other resilient 
material which does not depend upon compressed air for the support of 
the load. 
( 44) "Stand" or "standing" means the halting of a vehicle, whether 
occupied or not, other than temporarily for the purpose of and while 
actually engaged in receiving or discharging passengers. 
(45) "Stop" when required means complete cessation from movement. 
(46) "Stop" or "stopping" when prohibited means any halting even mo-
mentarily of a vehicle, whether occupied or not, except when necessary to 
avoid conflict with other traffic or when in compliance with the directions 
of a peace officer or official traffic-control device. 
( 4 7) "Traffic" means pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles, 
and other conveyances either singly or together while using any highway 
for the purpose of travel. 
(48) "Traffic-control signal" means any device, whether manually, elec-
trically, or mechanically operated, by which traffic is alternately directed 
to stop and permitted to proceed. 
(49) "Trailer" means every vehicle with or without motive power, other 
than a pole trailer, designed for carrying persons or property and for 
being drawn by a motor vehicle and constructed so that no part of its 
weight rests upon the towing vehicle. 
(50) "Truck" means every motor vehicle designed, used, or maintained 
primarily for the transportation of property. 
(51) "Truck tractor" means a motor vehicle designed and used primar-
ily for drawing other vehicles and constructed to carry a part of the 
weight of the vehicle and load drawn by the truck tractor. 
(52) "Urban district" means the territory contiguous to and including 
any street, in which structures devoted to business, industry, or dwelling 
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houses are situated at intervals of less than 100 feet, for a distance of a 
quarter of a mile or more. 
(53) "Vehicle" means every device in, upon, or by which any person or 
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except de-
vices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-1, enacted by L. 
1979,ch.242,§ 1; 1986,ch.36,§ 1;1987,ch. 
138, § 1; 1987, ch. 162, § 25. 
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1979, 
ch. 242, § 1 repealed former section 41-6-1 (L. 
1941, ch. 52, § 1; C. 1943, 57-7-78; L. 1949, ch. 
65, § 1; 1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 9, § 5), relating to 
definitions, and enacted present section 41-6-1. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment, by Chapter 138, alphabetized and re-
numbered the definitions in this section ac-
cordingly; in Subsection (3) substituted "except 
scooters and similar devices" for "either of 
which is more than 12 inches in diameter" at 
the end; in Subsection (4) substituted "15 pas-
sengers" for "ten passengers"; in Subsection (8) 
substituted "by unpaved intervening space" for 
"by leaving an intervening space"; in Subsec-
tion (9) substituted "causing death or serious 
bodily injury" for "destroying life or limb" at 
the end; in Subsection (13) substituted the 
present provisions for "Highway means the en-
tire width between the boundary lines of every 
way publicly maintained when any part of it is 
open to the use of the public for purposes of 
vehicular travel"; in Subsection (14) substi-
tuted "roadways of two or more highways" for 
"roadways of two highways" and omitted from 
the ·end "at, or approximately at, right angles, 
or the area within which vehicles traveling 
upon different highways joining at any other 
angle come in conflict"; in Subsection (17) sub-
stituted "Mobile home" for "House-trailer" in 
both places it appears; in Subsection (b) substi-
tuted "Subsection (17)" for "Subsection (18)"; 
inserted the present Subsection (18); in Subsec-
tion (19) added at the end "except vehicles 
moved solely by human power and motorized 
wheel chairs"; in Subsection (20) added at the 
end "in contact with the ground"; in Subsection 
(21) substituted the present provisions for "mo-
tor-driven cycle means every motorcycle, in-
cluding every motor scooter, with a motor 
which produces not to exceed five horsepower, 
and every bicycle with motor attached"; in 
Subsection (23) substituted "Operator" for 
"Driver"; in Subsection (25) substituted "Peace 
officer" for "Police officer" and substituted "law 
enforcement officer authorized under Section 
77-la-1" for "officer authorized"; in Subsection 
(32) substituted the pr.isent provisions for 
"railroad train means a steam engine, electric 
or other motor, with or without cars coupled to 
it operated upon rails"; in Subsection (34) at 
the end of the first sentence substituted the 
present provisions for "exclusive of the berm, 
or shoulder"; in Subsection (36) substituted the 
present provisions for the former provisions of 
Subsection (41) of this section as last amended 
by Laws 1986, ch. 36, § 1; in Subsection (43) 
substituted "a peace officer or official traffic-
control device" for "a police officer or traffic-
control sign or signal"; deleted the provisions 
of the former Subsections (2), (6), (20), (37), 
(46), (50), and (51) as last amended by Laws 
1986, ch. 36, § 1; and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation throughout the 
section. 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 162, in-
serted present Subsections (2), (28) and (29) 
and redesignated the subsequent subsections 
accordingly. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. - Disabled persons, 
parking privileges, § 41-1-49.9. 
Municipal regulations, § 10-8-30. 
Words and phrases defined by statute, con-
struction of, § 68-3-11. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Ambulance service. 
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Ambulance service. 
Ambulance operated by service registered 
with public service commission, and involved 
in accident while making emergency run was 
"authorized emergency vehicle" within mean-
ing of statute and was in privileged status with 
respect to speed limits and traffic signals de-
spite contentions that ambulance driver was 
negligent as matter of law for exceeding speed 
limit and ignoring traffic signals, that ambu-
lance service was not "public service corpora-
tion" within the meaning of law, and that am-
bulance service was not authorized by "local 
authority." Howe v. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269, 
421 P.2d 159 (1966). 
Construction and application. 
This title pertains preponderantly to motor 
vehicles not confined to tracks viz.: automo-
biles and motorcycles and the like. It is a Uni-
form Act designed to regulate nonrail vehicu-
lar traffic on streets, and, therefore, expressly 
excludes steam trains, trolley and interurban 
cars. Thorpe v. Bamberger R.R., 107 Utah 265, 
153 P.2d 541 (1944), discussing repeal of for-
mer laws and holding that the power to require 
interurban trains to stop at through streets 
was, by the legislature, granted to cities en-
tirely independent of Title 41, U. C. A. 1953, 
and referring to Title 10, which contains most 
of the power granted by the legislature to cities 
and towns. 
Prior to 1949 amendment, this section ex-
cluded from the operation of this act "vehicles 
used exclusively upon stationary rails and 
tracks." Thorpe v. Bamberger R.R., 107 Utah 
265, 153 P.2d 541 (1944). See present Subsec-
tion (53), defining "vehicle". 
Crosswalks. 
Even though many people may cross a street 
at a certain place, a crosswalk is not created 
since use, by itself, does not establish a right-
of-way for pedestrians. Langlois v. Rees, 10 
Utah 2d 272, 351 P.2d 638 (1960). 
The statutory definition implied that there 
was an unmarked crosswalk only if a street's 
sidewalk (or the edge of the traversable road-
way) was intersected and continued on and if a 
pedestrian way terminated at an intersection, 
it terminated without crossing the street un-
less it continued as a marked crosswalk. 
Langlois v. Rees, 10 Utah 2d 272, 351 P.2d 638 
(1960). 
Intersection. 
Jury was properly instructed that site of col-
lision was "intersection" under statute prohib-
iting passing another vehicle without 100 feet 
of intersection in light of evidence that cross-
ing road intersected main highway from both 
east and west and crossed it at right angles, 
that main highway was widened for about 1/10 
of a mile in both directions to provide extra 
lane for acceleration and deceleration in enter-
ing or leaving highway and that there were 
stop signs at both east and west side to warn 
oncoming traffic; result was not changed by 
fact that the crossing road was only infre-
quently traveled dirt road and not readily ob-
servable to main highway traveler. Hathaway 
v. Marx, 21 Utah 2d 33, 439 P.2d 850 (1968). 
Right-of-way statutes. 
The right-of-way statutes are designed to 
prevent an accident by two persons both other-
wise lawfully on the roadway reaching the 
same place at the same time. The right-of-way 
is not absolute for either pedestrian or motor-
ist, but both have a continuing duty at all 
times to use reasonable care for the safety of 
others, even when one has the right-of-way 
over the other. Langlois v. Rees, 10 Utah 2d 
272, 351 P.2d 638 (1960). 
Roadways. 
Not every driveway between a sidewalk and 
a street falls within definition of roadway; pe-
destrian who was walking along edge of drive-
way and was out of regular course of travel was 
not contributorily negligent as a matter of law 
as to motorist who backed from garage and 
struck her. Ivie v. Richardson, 9 Utah 2d 5,336 
P.2d 781 (1959). 
Vehicle. 
-Horse. 
The defendant's conviction of operating ave-
hicle under the influence of alcohol denied him 
due process of law because the statute under 
which he was convicted (§ 41-6-44) did not give 
him adequate notice that being intoxicated 
while riding a horse was a crime. The defini-
tion of "vehicle" in this section cannot be legiti-
mately read to include horses. State v. 
Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7 A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 1 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 1 to 8, 
16. 
A.L.R- - Street corner or intersection, park-
ing illegally at or near, as affecting liability for 
motor vehicle accident, 4 A.L.R.3d 324. 
What is street or highway intersection 
within traffic rules, 7 A.L.R.3d 1204. 
Airplane or other aircraft as "motor vehicle" 
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or the like within statute providing for con-
structive or substituted service of process on 
nonresident motorist, 36 A.L.R.3d 1387. 
"Vehicle" or "land vehicle" within meaning 
of insurance policy provisions defining risks 
covered or excepted, 65 A.L.R.3d 824. 
Liability for injury or death allegedly caused 
by defective tire, 81 A.L.R.3d 318. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles = 1 to 3, 6. 
41-6-1.5. Private vehicle as emergency vehicle - Rules. 
The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety may make rules, 
consistent with this chapter, governing the use, in emergencies, of signal 
lights on privately-owned vehicles. The rules may include a rule allowing 
privately-owned vehicles to be designated for part-time emergency use. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-1.5, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 271, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment deleted the subsection designation from 
41-6-2 to 41-6-10. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Sections 41-6-2 to 41-6-10 (L. 
1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1955, ch. 71, § 1; 1957, ch. 
78, § 1; 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, §§ 1 to 
former Subsection (1), deleted Subsections (2) 
through (6) as enacted by Laws 1981, ch. 271, 
§ 1, and made minor changes in phraseology 
and punctuation in the present material. 
8), relating to definitions of terms for traffic 
regulation provisions, were repealed by Laws 
1979, ch. 242, § 74. 
ARTICLE 2 
EFFECT OF AND OBEDIENCE TO TRAFFIC 
REGULATIONS 
41-6-11. Chapter relates to vehicles on highways- Excep-
tions. 
The provisions of this chapter relating to the operation of vehicles refer 
exclusively to the operation of vehicles upon highways, except: 
(1) where a different place is specifically referred to in a given section; 
or 
(2) under the provisions of Section 41-6-13.5 and Sections 41-6-29 to 
41-6-45 inclusive, which apply upon highways and elsewhere throughout 
the state. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 2; C. 1943, 
57-7-79; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 2; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 3. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (2) inserted "Section 
41-6-13.5" following "provisions of' and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo- C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§§ 1 to 8, 
biles and Highway Traffic §§ 1, 2, 11 et seq., 16. 
204 et seq. Key Numbers. - Automobiles = 1 to 3, 6. 
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41-6-12. Violation of chapter - Class B misdemeanor, un-
less specified. 
A violation of any provision of this chapter is a class B misdemeanor, unless 
otherwise provided. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 3; C. 1943, 
57-7-80; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 3; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 4. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment rewrote the section. 
Cross-References. - Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Purpose of Motor Vehicle Code. 
The purpose of the Motor Vehicle Code is to 
govern the safety of the use and operation of 
motor vehicles, and one who violates provi-
sions of this act is presumed to intend the natu-
ral consequences of his violation; one such pro-
vision is the legislative determination that 
.10% of alcohol in blood content makes it dan-
gerous for a person to operate a vehicle, 
§ 41-6-44.2. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 
(Utah 1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 204. 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles e,, 6. 
41-6-13. Obedience to peace officer or other traffic con-
trollers. 
(1) A person may not willfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order 
or direction of any peace officer, fireman, flagger at a highway construction or 
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school crossing guard invested by law 
with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic. 
(2) When flaggers at highway construction or maintenance sites are direct-
ing traffic they shall use devices and procedures conforming to the latest 
edition of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and 
Highways." 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 4; C. 1943, 
57-7-81; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 5. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment designated the existing paragraph as 
Subsection (1), substituted "peace officer, fire-
man, flagger at a highway construction or 
maintenance site, or uniformed adult school 
crossing guard" for "police officer'' and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctua-
tion; and added Subsection (2). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Obedience to traffic officer. 
Cited. 
Obedience to traffic officer. 
Pedestrian was denied recovery for injuries 
sustained when she was struck by overhang of 
motorbus where from the evidence it appeared 
that when she was half-way across the street 
the traffic light changed against her and she 
stopped in the safety zone, giving the other 
traffic the right-of-way, and that the overhang 
of the bus struck her as it rounded the corner 
in response to traffic officer's express direction. 
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Miller v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 96 Utah Cited in City of Salina v. Wisden, 737 P.2d 
369, 86 P.2d 37 (1939). 981 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 19. 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles P 10. 
41-6-13.5. Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop -
Fleeing - Traveling at excessive speeds or caus-
ing property damage or bodily injury - Penal-
ties. 
(1) An operator who, having received a visual or audible signal from a 
peace officer to bring his vehicle to a stop, operates his vehicle in willful or 
wanton disregard of the signal so as to interfere with or endanger the opera-
tion of any vehicle or person, or who attempts to flee or elude a peace officer by 
vehicle or other means is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(2) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing: (a) travels 
in excess of 30 miles per hour above the posted speed limit; (b) causes damage 
to the property of another or bodily injury to another; or (c) leaves the state, is 
guilty of a felony of the third degree. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-13.5, enacted by L. 
1978, ch. 33, § 38; L. 1981, ch. 269, § 1; 1987, 
ch. 138, § 6. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (1) substituted "peace offi-
cer" for "police officer" near the beginning of 
the subsection and near the end substituted "a 
peace office by vehicle or other means is" for 
"the police shall be"; in Subsection (2) desig-
nated the previously undesignated clauses and 
in Subsection (2)(a) substituted "30 miles per 
hour above the posted speed limit" for "90 
miles per hour"; and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation throughout the 
section. 
Cross-References. - Sentencing for felo-
nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
41-6-14. Emergency vehicles - Applicability of traffic law 
to highway work vehicles - Exemptions. 
(1) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to 
an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of 
the law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may 
exercise the privileges under this section, subject to Subsection (2). 
(2) The operator of an authorized emergency vehicle may: 
(a) park or stand, irrespective of the provisions of this chapter; 
(b) proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only after slowing 
down as may be necessary for safe operation; 
(c) exceed the maximum speed limits if the operator does not endanger 
life or property; or 
(d) disregard regulations governing direction of movement or turning 
in specified directions. 
(3) Privileges granted under this section to an authorized emergency vehi-
cle apply only when the vehicle sounds an audible signal under Section 
41-6-146, or uses a visual signal as defined under Section 41-6-132, which is 
visible from in front of the vehicle. 
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(a) The privileges under this section do not relieve the operator of an 
authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to operate the vehicle with 
regard for the safety of all persons, or protect the operator from the conse-
quences of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges. 
(b) Except for Sections 41-6-13.5, 41-6-44, and 41-6-45, this chapter 
does not apply to persons, motor vehicles, and other equipment while 
actually engaged in work upon the surface of a highway. However, the 
entire chapter applies to those persons and vehicles when traveling to or 
from the work. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-14, enacted by L. 
1955, ch. 71, § 1; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1965, 
ch. 83, § 1; 1978, ch. 33, § 4; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 7. 
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1955, 
ch. 71, § 1 repealed former section 41-6-14 (L. 
1941, ch. 52, § 5; C. 1943, 57-7-82; L. 1949, ch. 
65, § 1), relating to applicability and exemp-
tions from act of certain drivers, and enacted 
present section 41-6-14. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operator" for "driver" 
throughout the section; in Subsection (1) sub-
stituted "Subsection (2)" for "the conditions 
herein stated"; substituted the present provi-
sions of Subsection (3) for those set out in the 
bound volume and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation throughout the 
section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Accident involving emergency vehicle. 
Ambulance service. 
Construction. 
Accident involving emergency vehicle. 
In an action for injuries suffered by plaintiff 
in an accident with a police vehicle which oc-
curred at an intersection, the question as to 
whether plaintiff had been contributorily neg-
ligent was one of fact for the jury, and an in-
struction on the issue of assumption of risk 
from which jury could have believed that the 
plaintiff would be barred from recovery by as-
sumption of risk even if she had exercised due 
care under the circumstances, was error. John-
son v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884 
(1959). 
Plaintiff was not entitled to recover damages 
incident to an intersection collision between 
his car and car of defendant, a peace officer, 
responding to an emergency call, where plain-
tiff was negligent in not hearing siren on de-
fendant's car and defendant was driving at a 
reasonable speed of forty miles per hour while 
sounding siren and displaying a red light. Mar-
tin v. Ehlers, 13 Utah 2d 236, 371 P.2d 851 
(1962). 
Ambulance service. 
Ambulance operated by service registered 
with public service commission, and involved 
in accident while making emergency run was 
"authorized emergency vehicle" within the 
meaning of statute and was in privileged sta-
tus with respect to speed limits and traffic sig-
nals despite contentions that ambulance driver 
was negligent as matter of law for exceeding 
speed limit and ignoring traffic signals and 
that ambulance service was not "public service 
corporation" within the meaning of law. Howe 
v. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P.2d 159 
(1966). 
Construction. 
The 1949 amendment placed limitations on 
the right of emergency vehicles to proceed past 
a red stop light. The red light must be burning 
on the vehicle and the siren sounding and the 
vehicle could proceed past the red stop light 
only after slowing down as may be necessary 
for safe operation. Thus the driver of a fire en-
gine was negligent in passing through a red 
light with his siren and red light on but failing 
to slow down at the intersection for safe opera-
tion. Jensen v. Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196,271 P.2d 
838 (1954). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
41-6-16 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 208. 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles = 11. 
41-6-15. Persons riding or driving animals subject to 
chapter. 
A person riding an animal or driving any animal-drawn vehicle upon a 
roadway is subject to this chapter, except the penalties regarding operator 
licenses specified under the alcohol or drug related traffic offenses do not 
apply. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 6; C. 1943, 
57-7-83; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 5; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 8. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "the penalties regarding op-
erator licenses specified under the alcohol or 
drug related traffic offenses do not apply" for 
"those provisions which by their nature can 
have no application" at the end. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 
(Utah 1986). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Liability for damage to motor ve-
hicle or injury to person riding therein from 
collision with runaway horse, or horse left un-
attended or untied in street, 49 A.L.R.4th 653. 
41-6-16. Uniform application of chapter - Effect of local 
ordinances. 
The provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout this 
state and in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A local author-
ity may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provi-
sions of this chapter. Local authorities may, however, adopt ordinances consis-
tent with this chapter, and additional traffic ordinances which are not in 
conflict with this chapter. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 7; C. 1943, 
57-7-84; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 9. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "chapter" for "act" and "ordi-
nance" for "regulation" throughout the section 
and made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation. 
Cross-References. - Powers and duties of 
all cities, traffic regulations, § 10-8-30. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic §§ 17, 206. 
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Key Numbers. - Automobiles = 7. 
41-6-17 MOTOR VEHICLES 
41-6-17. Regulatory powers of local authorities - Traffic-
control device affecting state highway - Neces-
sity of erecting traffic-control devices. 
(1) The provisions of this chapter do not prevent local authorities, with 
respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable exer-
cise of police power, from: 
(a) regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking; 
(b) regulating traffic by means of peace officers or official traffic-con-
trol devices; 
(c) regulating or prohibiting processions or assemblages on the high-
ways; 
(d) designating particular highways or roadways for use by traffic mov-
ing in one direction under Section 41-6-60; 
(e) establishing speed limits for vehicles in public parks, which super-
sede Section 41-6-48 regarding speed limits; 
(f) designating any highway as a through highway or designating any 
intersection or junction of roadways as a stop or yield intersection or 
junction; 
(g) restricting the use of highways under Section 27-12-145; 
(h) regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring the registration 
and inspection of them, including requiring a registration fee; 
(i) regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles or specified types of 
vehicles; 
(j) altering or establishing speed limits under Section 41-6-48; 
(k) requiring written accident reports under Section 41-6-42; 
(1) designating no-passing zones under Section 41-6-59; 
(m) prohibiting or regulating the use of controlled-access roadways by 
any class or kind of traffic under Section 41-6-65; 
(n) prohibiting or regulating the use of heavily traveled streets by any 
class or kind of traffic found to be incompatible with the normal and safe 
movement of traffic; 
(o) establishing minimum speed limits under Subsection 41-6-49(3); 
(p) designating and regulating traffic on play streets; 
(q) prohibiting pedestrians from crossing a highway in a business dis-
trict or any designated highway except in a crosswalk under Section 
41-6-77; 
(r) restricting pedestrian crossings at unmarked crosswalks under Sec-
tion 41-6-82.10; 
(s) regulating persons propelling push carts; 
(t) regulating persons upon skates, coasters, sleds, skateboards, and 
other toy vehicles; 
(u) adopting and enforcing temporary or experimental ordinances as 
necessary to cover emergencies or special conditions; 
(v) prohibiting drivers of ambulances from exceeding maximum speed 
limits; 
(w) adopting other traffic ordinances as specifically authorized by this 
chapter. 
(2) A local authority may not erect or maintain any official traffic-control 
device at any location which requires the traffic on any state highway to stop 
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before entering or crossing any intersecting highway unless approval in writ-
ing has first been obtained from the Department of Transportation. 
(3) An ordinance enacted under Subsection (l)(d), (e), (f), (g), (i), (j), (1), (m), 
(n), (p), or (r) is not effective until official traffic-control devices giving notice 
of the local traffic ordinances are erected upon or at the entrances to the 
highway or part of it affected as is appropriate. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-17, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 242, § 2; L. 1983, ch. 337, § 1; 1987, 
ch. 138, § 10. 
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1979, 
ch. 242, § 2 repealed former section 41-6-17 (L. 
1941, ch. 52, § 8; C. 1943, 57-7-85; L. 1949, ch. 
65, § l; 1961, ch. 86, § 1), relating to the regu-
latory powers of local authorities, and traffic-
control devices, and enacted present section 
41-6-17. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated the former provisions of 
this section as last amended by Laws 1983, ch. 
337, § l; in Subsection (1) deleted "streets and" 
preceding "highways," in Subsection (l)(b) sub-
stituted "peace officers" for "police officers," in 
Subsection (l)(e) substituted "which super-
sede" for "notwithstanding the provisions of' 
and added at the end "regarding speed limits," 
in Subsection (l)(q) substituted "highway" for 
"roadway," in Subsections (l)(u) and Subsec-
tion (l)(w) substituted "ordinances" for "regu-
lations"; in Subsection (3) substituted "ordi-
nances" for "regulations"; and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the entire section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Evidentiary rules. 
Parking of vehicles. 
Evidentiary rules. 
City had no express or implied power, under 
Subsection (a)(l), to make presence of illegally 
parked vehicle prima facie evidence that owner 
committed or authorized the violation. Nasfell 
v. Ogden City, 122 Utah 344, 249 P.2d 507 
(1952). 
Parking of vehicles. 
A city has no power to pass an ordinance 
declaring owners of vehicles prima facie re-
sponsible for illegal parking of such vehicles. 
Nasfell v. Ogden City, 122 Utah 344, 249 P.2d 
507 (1952). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7 A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic §§ 15 to 17, 219, 
221. 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles e=- 7. 
41-6-17.5. Private roads and parking areas. 
(1) (a) Any municipality or county may by ordinance provide that pri-
vately-owned and maintained roads or parking areas within the city or 
county, as described in the ordinance, are subject to this chapter, pro-
vided: 
(i) the roads or parking areas are generally held open for use of the 
public for purposes of vehicular travel or parking to serve commercial 
establishments; 
(ii) the privately-owned and maintained road is so connected with 
a highway that the public would not reasonably be able to determine 
that it is a privately-owned and maintained road; or 
(iii) a majority of the owners of the privately owned and main-
tained road have signed a petition and submitted it to the municipal-
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ity or county, requesting that the road be included in an ordinance 
enacted under this section. 
(b) An ordinance may not be enacted under this subsection without a 
public hearing and without the agreement of the owner of the privately-
owned and maintained highway or parking area involved. 
(2) The department is not required under this section to patrol or enforce 
any provisions of this chapter on any privately-owned and maintained road or 
parking area, but is required to enforce those provisions of this chapter appli-
cable to private property other than under this section. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-17.5, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 33, § 1. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1988, Chapter 33 
became effective on April 25, 1988, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
41-6-18. Right of real property owner to regulate traffic. 
This chapter does not prevent the owner of real property used by the public 
for purposes of vehicular travel by permission of the owner and not as matter 
of right from prohibiting the use, or from requiring other or different or addi-
tional conditions other than those specified in this chapter, or otherwise regu-
lating the use as preferred by the owner, except as may be required under 
Section 41-6-17.5. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 9; C. 1943, 
57-7-86; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 11; 1988, ch. 33, 
§ 2. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "This chapter does not" for 
"Nothing in this act shall be construed to" at 
the beginning and at the end substituted "the 
use as preferred by the owner" for "such use as 
may seem best to such owner" and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1988, inserted "other" following "additional 
conditions" and added "except as may be re-
quired under Section 41-6-17.5" at the end of 
the section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 205. 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ,s,, 10. 
41-6-19. Removal of plants or other obstructions impair-
ing view - Notice to owner - Penalty. 
(1) The owner of real property shall remove from his property any tree, 
plant, shrub, or other obstruction, or part of it, which, by obstructing the view 
of any operator, constitutes a traffic hazard. 
(2) When the Department of Transportation or any local authority deter-
mines upon the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation that a traffic 
hazard exists, it shall notify the owner and order that the hazard be removed 
within ten days. 
(3) The failure of the owner to remove the traffic hazard within ten days is 
a class C misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-19, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 242, § 3; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 12. 
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1979, 
ch. 242, § 3 repealed former section 41-6-19 (L. 
1949, ch. 65, § 1), relating to removal of brush, 
foliage, or other obstructions impairing view of 
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intersections or railroad grade crossings, and 
enacted present section 41-6-19. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (3) substituted "is a class C 
misdemeanor" for "shall constitute an offense 
punishable by a penalty of $50 and every day 
said owner shall fail to remove it shall be a 
separate and distinct offense" and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
Cross-References. - Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 16. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ,:;;:, 6. 
41-6-19.10. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Section 41-6-19.10 (L. 1975, ch. 
207, § 2), relating to an owner's duty to re-
move brush, foliage, or other obstruction im-
pairing a driver's view, and providing a pen-
alty, was repealed by Laws 1979, ch. 242, § 74. 
ARTICLE 3 
TRAFFIC SIGNS, SIGNALS AND MARKINGS 
41-6-20. Manual and specifications for uniform system of 
traffic-control devices. 
(1) The Transportation Commission shall adopt a manual and specifica-
tions for a uniform system of traffic-control devices consistent with the provi-
sions of this chapter for use upon highways within this state. The manual 
shall correlate with and where possible conform to the system set forth in the 
most recent revised edition of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control De-
vices for Streets and Highways" and other standards issued or endorsed by the 
Federal Highway Administrator. 
(2) The Transportation Commission shall adopt a manual and specifica-
tions for a uniform system of traffic-control devices for school crossing zones, 
which shall supplement Part VII of the manual adopted under Subsection (1). 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 10; C. 1943, 
57-7-87; L. 1979, ch. 242, § 4; 1986, ch. 45, 
§ 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 13. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amend-
ment designated the existing language as Sub-
section (1) and made various stylistic changes 
in the subsection and added Subsection (2). 
The 1987 amendment substituted "Transpor-
tation Commission" for "Department of Trans-
portation" in both places it appears and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic §§ 232 to 234. 
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Key Numbers. - Automobiles ¢ca 10. 
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41-6-21. Placing and maintenance upon state highways -
Restrictions on local authorities. 
(1) The Department of Transportation shall place and maintain traffic-con-
trol devices in conformance with its manual and specifications upon all state 
highways as it finds necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of 
this chapter or to regulate, warn, or guide traffic. 
(2) A local authority may not place or maintain any traffic-control device 
upon any highway under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation 
except by the latter's permission. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 11; C. 1943, 
57-7-88; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1979, ch. 242, 
§ 5; 1987, ch. 138, § 14. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "shall deem" for "finds" and 
"chapter" for "act" in Subsection (1); in Subsec-
tion (2) substituted "A local authority may not" 
for "No local authority shall"; and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Highways: governmental duty to 
provide curve warnings or markings, 57 
A.L.R.4th 342. 
41-6-22. Placing and maintenance upon local highways by 
local authorities. 
Local authorities, in their respective jurisdictions, shall place and maintain 
official traffic-control devices upon highways under their jurisdiction as they 
find necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of this chapter or 
local traffic ordinances, or to regulate, warn, or guide traffic. All traffic-con-
trol devices erected under this section shall conform to and be maintained in 
conformance with the Department of Transportation manual and specifica-
tions for a uniform system of traffic-control devices under Section 41-6-20. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 12; C. 1943, 
57-7-89; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 15. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "chapter" for "act", substi-
tuted "Department of Transportation manual 
and specifications for a uniform system of traf-
fic-control devices under § 41-6-20" for "state 
manual and specifications" and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Arn. Jur. 2d Autorno- provide curve warnings or markings, 57 
biles and Highway Traffic § 233. A.L.R.4th 342. 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. Key Numbers. - Automobiles eco 10. 
A.L.R. - Highways: governmental duty to 
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41-6-23. Obeying devices - Effect of improper position, 
illegibility, or absence - Presumption of lawful 
placement and compliance with_ chapter. 
(1) The operator of a vehicle shall obey the instructions of any official traf-
fic-control device placed or held in accordance with this chapter unless at the 
time otherwise directed by a peace officer, and subject to the exceptions 
granted the operator of an authorized emergency vehicle. 
(2) (a) Any provision of this chapter, for which official traffic-control de-
vices are required, may not be enforced against an alleged violator if at 
the time and place of the alleged violation an official device is not in 
proper position and sufficiently legible to be seen by an ordinarily obser-
vant person. 
(b) When a particular section does not state that official traffic-control 
devices are required, the section is effective even though no devices are 
erected or in place. 
(3) When official traffic-control devices are placed or held in a position 
approximately conforming to the requirements of this chapter, the devices are 
presumed to have been placed or held by the official act or direction of lawful 
authority, unless the contrary is established by competent evidence. 
(4) An official traffic-control device placed or held under this chapter and 
purporting to conform to the lawful requirements pertaining to that device is 
presumed to comply with the requirements of this chapter, unless the con-
trary is established by competent evidence. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 13; C. 1943, 
57-7-90; L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1969, ch. 104, 
§ I; 1978, ch. 33, § 6; 1987, ch. 138, § 16. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (1) substituted "operator" 
for "driver'' both places it appears and substi-
tuted "peace officer" for "police officer"; in Sub-
section (2) inserted designations; and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
Cross-References. - Duty to obey police 
officers, § 41-6-13. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Liability for automobile accident, 
other than direct collision with pedestrian, as 
affected by reliance upon or disregard of stop-
and-go signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 12. 
Liability for collision of automobile with pe-
destrian as affected by reliance upon or disre-
gard of stop-and-go signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 155. 
Liability for automobile accident at intersec-
tion as affected by reliance upon or disregard of 
"yield" sign or signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 275. 
Liability for automobile accident at intersec-
tion as affected by reliance upon or disregard of 
unchanging stop signal or sign, 3 A.L.R.3d 180. 
Liability for automobile accident at intersec-
tion as affected by reliance upon or disregard of 
unchanging caution, slow, danger, or like sign 
or signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 507. 
Liability for collision of automobile with pe-
destrian at intersection as affected by reliance 
upon or disregard of traffic sign or signal other 
than stop-and-go signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 557. 
41-6-24. Traffic-control signal - At intersections - At 
place other than intersection - Color of light sig-
nal. 
(1) When traffic is controlled by a traffic-control signal exhibiting different 
colored lights, or color lighted arrows, successively one at a time or in combi-
1Mtion, only the colors green, red, and yellow may be used, except for special 
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pedestrian signals carrying a word legend. The lights shall indicate and apply 
to operators of vehicles and pedestrians as provided in this section. 
(2) "Green" indicates: 
(a) Vehicular traffic facing a circular green signal may proceed 
straight through or turn right or left unless a sign at that place prohibits 
either turn. But the vehicular traffic, including vehicles turning right or 
left, shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles and to pedestrians law-
fully within the intersection or an adjacent crosswalk at the time the 
signal is exhibited. 
(b) Vehicular traffic facing a green arrow signal shown alone or in 
combination with other indication, may cautiously enter the intersection 
only to make the movement indicated by the arrow or other movement as 
is permitted by other indications shown at the same time. The vehicular 
traffic shall yield the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within an adja-
cent crosswalk and to other traffic lawfully using the intersection. 
(c) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-control signal under Sec-
tion 41-6-25, pedestrians facing any green signal except when the sole 
green signal is a turn arrow may proceed across the roadway within any 
marked or unmarked crosswalk. 
(3) Steady "Yellow" indicates: 
(a) Vehicular traffic facing a steady circular yellow or yellow arrow 
signal is warned that the "Red" signal will be exhibited next. 
(b) Pedestrians facing a steady circular yellow or yellow arrow signal, 
unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-control signal under Section 
41-6-25 are advised that there is insufficient time to cross the roadway 
before a red indication is shown, and no pedestrian may then start to 
cross the roadway. 
(4) Steady "Red" indicates: 
(a) Vehicular traffic facing a steady red signal alone shall stop before 
entering the intersection at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, before 
entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection and shall 
remain stopped until an indication to proceed is shown, except as pro-
vided in Subsection (4)(c). 
(b) Unless otherwise directed by a pedestrian-control signal under Sec-
tion 41-6-25, pedestrians facing a steady red signal alone may not enter 
the roadway. 
(c) Except when a sign is in place prohibiting a turn, vehicular traffic 
facing any steady red signal may cautiously enter the intersection to turn 
right, or may turn left from a one-way street into a one-way street, after 
stopping as required by Subsection (4)(a). The vehicular traffic shall yield 
the right-of-way to pedestrians lawfully within an adjacent crosswalk and 
to other traffic lawfully using the intersection. 
(5) The provisions of this section apply where an official traffic-control sig-
nal is erected and maintained at a place other than an intersection. Any stop 
required shall be made at a sign or marking on the highway pavement indi-
cating where the stop shall be made, but, in the absence of any sign or mark-
ing, the stop shall be made at the signal. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 14; C. 1943, 
57-7-91; L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1951, ch. 73, § 1; 
1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1973, ch. 81, § 1; 1975, ch. 
207, § 10; 1978, ch. 33, § 7; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 17. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend· 
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ment designated the former introductory para-
graph as present Subsection (1) and in the sub-
section substituted "operators" for "drivers"; 
designated former Subsection (1) as present 
Subsection (2) and redesignated subsequent 
subsections accordingly; in Subsection (3)(a) 
substituted "next" for "immediately thereafter 
and such vehicular traffic shall not enter the 
intersection when the 'Red' signal is exhib-
ited"; in Subsection (5) deleted at the end of the 
first section "The provisions of this section 
shall be applicable except as to those provi-
sions which by their nature can have no appli-
cation"; and made minor changes in phraseol-
ogy and punctuation throughout the section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Liability for automobile accident, 
other than direct collision with pedestrian, as 
affected by reliance upon or disregard of stop-
and-go signal, 2 A.L.R.3d 12. 
Liability for automobile accident at intersec-
tion as affected by reliance upon or disregard of 
unchanging stop signal or sign, 3 A.L.R.3d 180. 
Liability for automobile accident at intersec-
tion as affected by reliance upon or disregard of 
unchanging caution, slow, danger, or like sign 
or signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 507. 
41-6-25. Special pedestrian-control signals - Meaning of 
signals - Rights and duties. 
When special pedestrian-control signals exhibiting the words "Walk" or 
"Don't Walk" or symbols of "Walking Person" or "Upraised Palm" are in 
place, the signals indicate: 
(a) Flashing or steady "Walk" or symbol of "Walking Person" means a 
pedestrian facing the signal may proceed across the roadway in the direc-
tion of the signal and the operators of all vehicles shall yield the right-of-
way to him. 
(b) Flashing or steady "Don't Walk" or "Upraised Palm" means a pe-
destrian may not start to cross the roadway in the direction of the signal, 
but a pedestrian who has partially completed his crossing on the walk 
signal shall proceed to a sidewalk or safety island while the "Don't Walk" 
or "Upraised Palm" signal is showing. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 15; C. 1943, 
57-7-92; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 11; 1987, ch. 138, § 18. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in the opening clause inserted "or sym-
bols of'Walking Person"'; in Subsection (a) in-
serted "Flashing or steady" preceding "Walk," 
and inserted "or symbol of 'Walking Person' 
means a pedestrian" and substituted "opera-
tors" for "drivers"; in Subsection (b) inserted 
"Flashing or steady" at the beginning and in-
serted "or 'Upraised Palm"' in two places; and 
made minor changes in phraseology and punc-
tuation throughout the section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.LR. - Liability for collision of automo-
bile with pedestrian as affected by reliance 
upon or disregard of stop-and-go signal, 2 
A.L.R.3d 155. 
Liability for collision of automobile with pe-
destrian at intersection as affected by reliance 
upon or disregard of traffic sign or signal other 
than stop-and-go signal, 3 A.L.R.3d 557. 
41-6-26. Flashing red or yellow signals - Rights and du-
ties of operators - Railroad grade crossings ex-
cluded. 
(1) When an illuminated flashing red or yellow signal is used in a traffic 
signal or with a traffic sign, vehicular traffic shall obey it as follows: 
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(a) Flashing red stop signal: When a red signal is illuminated by rapid 
intermittent flashes, operators of vehicles shall stop at a clearly marked 
stop line, but if none, before entering the crosswalk on the nearest side of 
the intersection, or if none, then at a point nearest the intersecting road-
way where the operator has a view of approaching traffic on the intersect-
ing roadway before entering. The right to proceed is subject to the rules 
applicable after making a stop at a stop sign. 
(b) Flashing yellow caution signal: When a yellow signal is illuminated 
with rapid intermittent flashes, operators of vehicles may proceed 
through the intersection or past the signal only with caution. 
(2) This section does not apply at railroad grade crossings. Provisions re-
garding vehicles approaching railroad grade crossings are under Section 
41-6-95. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 16; C. 1943, 
57-7-93; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1975, ch. 207, 
§ 12; 1987, ch. 138, § 19. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated the subsections, substituted 
"signal" for "lens" and "operators" for "drivers" 
throughout the section and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
41-6-26.5. Lane use control signals - Colors. 
When lane use control signals are placed over individual lanes, the signals 
indicate and apply to operators of vehicles as follows: 
(1) Green signal - vehicular traffic may travel in any lane over which 
a green signal is shown. 
(2) Steady yellow signal - vehicular traffic is warned that a lane con-
trol change is being made. 
(3) Steady red signal - vehicular traffic may not enter or travel in any 
lane over which a red signal is shown. 
( 4) Flashing yellow signal - vehicular traffic may use the lane only for 
the purpose of approaching and making a left turn. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-26.5, enacted by L. 
1969, ch. 105, § 1; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 8; 1987, 
ch. 138, § 20. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operators" for "drivers" in 
the opening clause and substituted "signal" for 
"indication" throughout the section and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
41-6-27. Prohibition of unauthorized signs, signals, lights 
or markings - Commercial advertising - Public 
nuisance - Removal. 
(1) A person may not place, maintain, or display upon or in view of any 
highway any unauthorized sign, signal, light, marking, or device which pur-
ports to be or is an imitation of or resembles an official traffic-control device or 
railroad sign or signal, or authorized emergency vehicle flashing light, or 
which: 
(a) attempts to direct the movement of traffic; 
(b) hides from view or interferes with the effectiveness of any official 
traffic-control device or any railroad sign or signal; or 
(c) which is of such brilliant illumination and so positioned as to blind 
or dazzle an operator on any adjacent highway. 
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(2) A person may not place or maintain nor may any public authority per-
mit upon any highway any traffic sign or signal bearing on it any commercial 
advertising except for business signs included as part of official motorist ser-
vice panels approved by the Department of Transportation. This provision 
does not prohibit the erection upon private property adjacent to highways of 
signs giving useful directional information and of a type that may not be 
mistaken for official signs. 
(3) Every prohibited sign, signal, or light, or marking is declared to be a 
public nuisance and the authority having jurisdiction over the highways may 
remove it or cause it to be removed without notice. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 17; C. 1943, 
57-7-94; L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 
1987, ch. 138, § 21. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated the provisions of this sec-
tion; in Subsection (l)(c) substituted "operator" 
for "driver"; in Subsection (2) inserted "except 
for business signs included as part of official 
motorist service panels approved by the De-
partment of Transportation" at the end of the 
first sentence; and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation throughout the 
section. 
41-6-28. Interference with signs and signals prohibited. 
1 A person may not without lawful authority attempt to or in fact alter, 
deface, injure, knock down, or remove any official traffic-control device or any 
railroad sign or signal or any inscription, shield, or insignia on it, or any other 
part of it. 
History: L 1941, ch. 52, § 18; C. 1943, 
57-7-95; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 22. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation throughout the section. 
ARTICLE 4 
ACCIDENTS 
41-6-29. Operator's duty at accident - Stop at accident -
Penalty. 
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to 
or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the 
accident or as close to it as possible and shall immediately return to and 
remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of 
Section 41-6-31. The stop may not obstruct traffic more than is necessary. 
(2) A person failing to stop or to comply with the requirements of Subsec-
tion (1) is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 19; C. 1943, 
57-7-96; L. 1961, ch. 86, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, 
§ 31; 1986, ch. 178, § 27; 1987, ch. 92, § 54; 
1987, ch. 138, § 23. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amend-
ment inserted "of Subsection (1)" and "shall 
be" following "county jail," substituted "is 
guilty of a class A misdemeanor; a penalty of' 
for "shall upon conviction be punished by" and 
"and a fine imposed shall be" for "nor more 
than one year or by fine of," and deleted "or by 
both such fine and imprisonment" from the 
end, all in Subsection (b); and made minor 
word changes in the first sentence of Subsec-
tion (a) and in Subsection (b). 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 92, 
changed the subsection designations. 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 138, re-
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designated former Subsections (a) and (b) as 
last amended by Laws 1986, ch. 178, § 27 as 
present Subsections (1) and (2); in Subsection 
(1) substituted "operator" for "driver"; in Sub-
section (2) deleted at the end "a penalty of im-
prisonment in the county jail shall be for not 
less than 30 days, and a fine imposed shall be 
not less than $100 nor more than $5,000"; de-
leted former Subsection (c), which read "The 
department shall revoke the operator's license 
of the person so convicted for a period not to 
exceed one year"; and made minor changes in 
phraseology and punctuation throughout the 
section. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. - Sentencing for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Penalty for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 
76-3-301. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Newly discovered evidence. 
Where, in prosecution of hit-and-run driver 
under this section, evidence is discovered after 
the jury has retired to commence their deliber-
ations which would sustain defendant's defense 
of alibi, it is abuse of discretion and reversible 
error to refuse to grant a new trial on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence, which 
was not merely cumulative. State v. Duncan, 
102 Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121 (1942). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. - Stalking the Good 
Samaritan: Communists, Capitalists and the 
Duty to Rescue, 1976 Utah L. Rev. 529. 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic §§ 289 et seq., 363, 
382. 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§ 43; 61A 
C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §§ 674 to 683. 
A.L.R. - Necessity and sufficiency of show-
ing in a criminal prosecution under a "hit-and-
run" statute accused's knowledge of accident, 
injury, or damage, 23 A.L.R.3d 497. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <i=> 10, 336. 
41-6-30. Accidents involving damage to vehicle or prop-
erty - Stop at accident. 
The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage 
to a vehicle or other property which is operated or attended by any person, 
shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close to it 
as possible, and shall immediately return to and remain at the scene of the 
accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 41-6-31. The stop 
may not obstruct traffic more than is necessary. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 20; C. 1943, 
57-7-97; L. 1977, ch. 269, § l; 1979, ch. 242, 
§ 6; 1987, ch. 138, § 24. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in the first sentence substituted "opera-
tor" for "driver" and "operated" for "driven," 
omitted the former last sentence, which read 
"Any person failing to stop or comply with said 
requirements under such circumstances shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor" and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
41-6-31. Accident involving injury, death, or property 
damage - Duties of operator, occupant, or 
owner. 
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to 
or death of any person or damage to any vehicle or other property which is 
operated or attended by any person shall: 
(a) give to any persons involved his name, address, and the registration 
number of the vehicle he is operating; 
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(b) upon request and if available exhibit his operator's license to any 
investigating peace officer present and to the person struck or the opera-
tor or occupant of or person attending any vehicle or owner of other 
property damaged in the accident; and 
(c) render to any person injured in the collision reasonable assistance, 
including the transporting, or the making of arrangements for the trans-
porting, of the person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or 
surgical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if the 
transporting is requested by the injured person. 
(2) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to 
or death of any person or property damage to an apparent extent of $400 or 
more shall immediately and by the quickest means of communication avail-
able give notice of the accident to the nearest office of an authorized law 
enforcement agency. 
(3) When the operator of a vehicle is physically incapable of giving an 
immediate notice of an accident as required in Subsections (1) and (2) and 
there is another occupant in the vehicle at the time of the accident capable of 
doing so, the occupant shall give or cause to be given the notice not given by 
the operator. 
(4) When the operator is physically incapable of making a written report of 
an accident when required under Section 41-6-35 and he is not the owner of 
the vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident shall within 
15 days after becoming aware of the accident make the report not made by the 
operator. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 21; C. 1943, 
57-7-98; L 1983, ch. 183, § 32; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 25. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment redesignated the previously undesig-
nated provisions of this section as amended by 
Laws 1983, ch. 183, § 32; in Subsection (1), in 
the introductory paragraph substituted "opera-
tor" for "driver," inserted "or other property" 
following "damage to any vehicle," substituted 
"operated" for "driven," in Subsection (l)(a) in-
serted "to any person involved" at the begin-
ning, and in Subsection (l)(b) inserted "to any 
investigating peace officer present and," sub-
stituted "operator" for "driver," substituted "or 
owner of other property damaged in the acci-
dent" for "collided with and shall"; made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout Subsection (1); and added present 
Subsections (2) through (4). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 294. 
A.L.R. - Validity and construction of stat-
ute making it a criminal offense for the opera-
tor of a motor vehicle not to carry or display his 
operator's license or the vehicle registration 
certificate, 6 A.L.R.3d 506. 
41-6-32. Collision with unattended vehicle or other prop-
erty - Duties of operator. 
The operator of a vehicle which collides with or is involved in an accident 
with any vehicle or other property which is unattended and which results in 
damage to the other vehicle or property shall immediately stop and either 
locate and notify the operator or owner of the vehicle or the owner of other 
property of the operator's name and address and the registration number of 
the vehicle causing the damage, or shall attach securely in a conspicuous 
place on the vehicle or other property a written notice giving the operator's 
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name and address and the registration number of the vehicle causing the 
damage. If applicable, the operator shall also give notice under Subsections 
41-6-31(2) and (3). 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 22; C. 1943, 
57-7-99; L. 1977, ch. 269, § 2; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 26. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operator" for "driver" 
throughout the section, in the present last sen-
tence substituted "under Subsections 41-6-
31(2) and (3)" for "as provided in Section 
41-6-34," omitted the former last sentence, 
which read "Any person failing to comply with 
said requirements under such circumstances is 
guilty of an infraction" and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 10. 
41-6-33, 41-6-34. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Section 41-6-33 (L. 1941, ch. 52, 
§ 23; C. 1943, 57-7-100), relating to accidents 
resulting only in damage to fixtures legally 
upon or adjacent to a highway, was repealed by 
Laws 1977, ch. 269, § 6. 
Laws 1987, ch. 138, § 106, repeals§ 41-6-34 
as last amended by Laws 1979, ch. 242, § 7, 
concerning reporting accidents involving in-
jury, death, or damage of $400 or more. For 
present provisions, see § 41-6-31. 
41-6-35. Accident reports - Duty of operator and investi-
gative officer to forward or render. 
(1) The department may request any operator of a vehicle involved in an 
accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or total property damage 
to the apparent extent of $400 or more to, within ten days after the request, 
forward a written report of the accident to the department. 
(2) The department may require any operator of a vehicle involved in an 
accident, of which report is made under Subsection (1), to file supplemental 
reports when the original report is insufficient in the opinion of the depart-
ment and may require witnesses of accidents to render reports to the depart-
ment. 
(3) A written accident report is not required under this section from any 
person who is physically incapable of making a report, during his period of 
incapacity. 
(4) Every peace officer, who in the regular course of duty, investigates a 
motor vehicle accident described under Subsection (1), shall file a report of the 
accident with the department within ten days after completing the investiga-
tion. The report shall be made either at the time of and at the scene of the 
accident or later by interviewing participants or witnesses. 
(5) The written reports required to be filed with the department by peace 
officers and the information in them are not privileged or confidential. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 25; C. 1943, 
57-7-102; L. 1949, ch. 65, § l; 1961, ch. 86, 
§ 1; 1969,ch. 106, § 1;1973,ch.82,§ 1;1979, 
ch. 242, § 8; 1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § l; 1987, 
ch. 138, § 27. 
Amendment Notes, - The 1986 (2nd S.S.) 
amendment, effective July 1, 1986, inserted 
"department may request any" and substituted 
"to within ten days after the request" for "shall 
within five days after such accident" and "the 
accident" for "such accident" in Subsection (a); 
substituted "is made under Subsection (a)" for 
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"must be made as provided in this section" and 
"when" for "whenever" in Subsection (b); sub-
stituted "this section" for "this chapter" and 
deleted "such" preceding "incapacity" in Sub-
section (c); divided Subsection (d) into two sen-
tences, substituting the language beginning 
"described under Subsection (a)" at the end of 
the first sentence and "The report shall be 
made" at the beginning of the second sentence 
for "of which report must be made as required 
in this section"; substituted "later" for "there-
after" and deleted "shall, within five days after 
completing such investigation, forward a writ-
ten report of such accident to the department" 
from the end, in Subsection (d); and substituted 
"The" for "Such," "filed with the department" 
for "forwarded," and "in them are not privi-
leged or confidential" for "contained therein 
shall not be privileged or held confidential" in 
Subsection (e). 
The 1987 amendment redesignated the pro-
visions of this section as last amended by Laws 
1983, ch. 183, § 32, substituted "operator" for 
"driver" throughout the section, in Subsections 
(4) and (5) substituted "peace officers" for "law 
enforcement officers" and made minor changes 
in phraseology and punctuation throughout 
the section. 
Cross-References. - Accident reports, 
§ 41-12a-502. 
Filing of false report, § 41-12a-602. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Manslaughter. 
Reports as basis for determination of security deposit. 
Manslaughter. 
Acquittal under former statute was not bar 
to manslaughter prosecution. State v. 
Cheeseman, 63 Utah 138, 223 P. 762 (1924). 
Reports as basis for determination of secu-
rity deposit. 
Order of commission revoking plaintiffs' 
driving licenses due to their failure to deposit 
security after accident was authorized even 
though, after expiration of fifty days, no in-
jured party had manifested an intent to seek 
compensation and none had filed proof under 
former Safety Responsibility Act; commission 
could require deposit on basis of reports or 
other evidence and suspend licenses for failure 
to furnish deposit. Simmons v. State, Dep't of 
Pub. Safety, 24 Utah 2d 146, 467 P.2d 414 
(1970). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles -s=> 10. 
41-6-35.5. Vehicle accidents - Investigation and report of 
operator security - Agency action if no security 
- Surrender of plates - Penalties. 
(1) When a peace officer investigating an accident involving a motor vehi-
cle cites the operator of a motor vehicle involved for the alleged violation of 
any provision of this title, the cited operator shall at the peace officer's request 
provide evidence of the owner's or operator's security required by Section 
41-12a-301. 
(2) The peace officer shall record on a form approved by the department the 
information provided by the operator, and also indicate if the operator pro-
vided insufficient or no information. The officer shall also note on the form if 
he finds reasonable cause to believe that any information given is not correct. 
(3) The peace officer shall deposit all completed forms with his agency, 
which shall forward the forms to the department no later than ten days after 
receipt. 
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(4) The department shall within ten days of receipt of the forms from the 
agency take action as follows: 
(a) If the operator provided no information under Subsection (1), the 
department shall take direct action under Subsection 41-2-128(12). 
(b) If the peace officer noted or the department determines that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the information given under Subsection 
(1) is not correct, the department shall contact directly the insurance 
company or other provider of security as described in Subsection (7) and 
request verification, which the department may require to be in writing, 
within 30 days of receipt of the request, of the accuracy of the information 
submitted as of the date of the traffic offense for which the citation was 
issued. 
(c) If the department does not receive verification within 35 days after 
mailing the request, or within the 35 days receives notice that the infor-
mation was not correct, the department shall take action under Subsec-
tion 41-2-128(12). 
(5) (a) The owner of a vehicle with unexpired license plates for which secu-
rity is not provided as required under this chapter, shall return the plates 
for the vehicle to the Motor Vehicles Division unless specifically permit-
ted by statute to retain them. 
(b) If the owner fails to return the plates as required, they shall be 
confiscated under Section 41-2-134. 
(6) The department may make rules for the enforcement of this section. 
(7) In this section, "evidence of owner's or operator's security" means: 
(a) the name of the insurance company which issued the insurance 
policy under Subsection 41-12a-103(9)(a), and the number of the insur-
ance policy; 
(b) the name of the surety which issued the surety bond under Subsec-
tion 41-12a-103(9)(b), and the number of the insurance policy; 
(c) the number of the certificate of deposit issued by the state treasurer 
under Section 41-12a-406; or 
(d) the number of the certificate of self-funded coverage issued by the 
department under Section 41-12a-407. 
(8) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, and shall be fined not less 
than $100, who: 
(a) when requested to provide security information under Subsection 
(1) provides false information; 
(b) falsely represents to the department that security required under 
this chapter is in effect; or 
(c) sells a vehicle to avoid the penalties of this section as applicable 
either to himself or a third party. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-35.5, enacted by L. 
1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 2; 1987, ch. 138, § 28; 
L. 1988, ch. 98, § 2. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (1) substituted "peace offi-
cer" for "officer" in the second place it appears; 
in Subsection (2) substituted "peace officer" for 
"officer" in the first place it appears; in Subsec-
tion (4)(a) substituted "41-2-128(12)" for 
"41-2-19(11)," in Subsection (4)(b) substituted 
"peace officer" for "officer" and substituted 
"Subsection (7)" for "Subsection (6)," and in 
Subsection (4)(c) substituted "41-2-128(12)" for 
"41-2-19(11)"; in Subsection (5)(a) added at the 
end "unless specifically permitted by statute to 
retain them," and in Subsection (5)(b) substi-
tuted "41-2-134" for "41-2-23.5"; and made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1988, inserted "which the department may re-
quire to be" near the middle in Subsection 
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(4)(b), redesignated former Subsection (9) as 
present Subsection (8)(c), and deleted "A per-
son is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor and 
shall be fined not less than $100 who" at the 
beginning thereof. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1986 (2nd S.S.), 
41-6-36. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Laws 1987, ch. 138, § 106, re-
peals§ 41-6-36 as last amended by Laws 1979, 
ch. 269, § 4 concerning the physical incapacity 
ch. 4, § 4 makes the act effective on July 1, 
1986. 
Cross-References. - Penalty for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
of drivers. For present provisions, see 
§ 41-6-31. 
41-6-37. Accident reports - Forms - Contents - Penal-
ties for failure to make report. 
(1) The department shall prepare and upon request supply to police depart-
ments, justices of the peace, sheriffs, garages, and other appropriate agencies 
or individuals, forms for accident reports as required in this article, suitable 
for the persons required to make the reports and the purposes to be served. 
The written reports to be made by persons involved in accidents as requested 
by investigating officers shall require sufficiently detailed information to dis-
close the cause, conditions then existing, and the persons and vehicles in-
volved in the traffic accident. 
(2) Every accident report requested under Section 41-6-35 shall be made in 
writing and on the appropriate form approved by the department. It shall 
contain all of the information required which is available. 
(3) The department shall suspend the license or permit to operate a vehicle 
and any nonresident operating privileges of any person failing to report an 
accident as requested under Section 41-6-35 until the report has been filed. 
The department may extend the suspension, not to exceed 30 days. Any per-
son convicted of failing to make a report under Section 41-6-35 is punishable 
under Section 41-6-164. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 27; C. 1943, 
57-7-104; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1961, ch. 86, 
§ 1; 1979, ch. 242, § 9; 1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, 
§ 3; 1987, ch. 138, § 29. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 (2nd S.S.) 
amendment, effective July 1, 1986, substituted 
"requested under§ 41-6-35 shall" for "required 
to" in Subsection (b); deleted former Subsection 
(c); redesignated former Subsection (d) as 
present Subsection (c); substituted "requested 
under § 41-6-35" for "herein provided" in the 
first sentence of present Subsection (c) and 
"under § 41-5-35 is punishable under" for "as 
required herein shall be punished as provided 
in" in the second sentence of that subsection; 
and made other, minor word changes through-
out the section. 
The 1987 amendment redesignated the sub-
sections of this section as last amended by 
Laws 1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 3, in Subsection 
(3) substituted "operate a vehicle" for "drive" 
and "41-6-35" for "41-5-35," and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 10. 
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41-6-38. Livestock on highway - Restrictions - Collision, 
action for damages. 
(1) A person owning or in the possession or control of any livestock, may not 
willfully or negligently permit any of the livestock to stray or remain unac-
companied by a person in charge or control of the livestock upon a highway, 
both sides of which are adjoined by property which is separated from the 
highway by a fence, wall, hedge, sidewalk, curb, lawn, or building. This sub-
section does not apply to range stock drifting onto any highway in going to or 
returning from their accustomed ranges. 
(2) A person may not drive any livestock upon, over, or across any highway 
during the period from half an hour after sunset to half an hour before sun-
rise, without keeping a sufficient number of herders with warning lights on 
continual duty to open the road to permit the passage of vehicles. 
(3) In any civil action brought by the owner, operator, or occupant of a 
motor vehicle or by their personal representatives or assignees, or by the 
owner of the livestock for damages caused by collision with any domestic 
animal or animals on a highway, there is no presumption that the collision 
was due to negligence on behalf of the owner or the person in possession of 
livestock. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 28; C. 1943, 
57-7-105; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 30. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment inserted subsection designations, in Sub-
section (3) substituted "operator" for "driver" 
and made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation throughout the section. 
Cross-References. - Livestock highways, 
§ 27-12-117 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
No presumption provision. 
Constitutionality. 
This section and § 4-25-8 do not unconstitu-
tionally discriminate among similarly situated 
plaintiffs in actions involving unrestricted 
livestock merely because each provision im-
poses a different burden of proving liability. 
The legislature reasonably could have con-
cluded that people's interest in the crops, 
fences and even personal security on their own 
land is both greater and different in kind than 
travelers' interest in safety on the highway. 
Vaderwater v. Hatch, 835 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 
1987). 
No presumption provision. 
This provision is clear and unambiguous and 
in an action where plaintiffs motorcycle col-
lided with a horse on a highway, it means that 
there is no presumption that the defendant was 
guilty in permitting the horses to be upon the 
highway under the conditions that were found 
there and the burden rests upon the plaintiff to 
establish acts of negligence. Hyrum Smith Es-
tate Co. v. Peterson, 227 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 
1955). 
Trial court properly directed verdict for de-
fendant owner of horse struck by vehicle, since 
under this section the mere fact defendant's 
horses escaped from enclosure was not suffi-
cient to justify submitting defendant's negli-
gence to jury. Rhiness v. Dansie, 24 Utah 2d 
375, 472 P.2d 428 (1970). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
41-6-39 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
A.L.R. - Liability for damage to motor ve-
hicle or injury to person riding therein from 
collision with runaway horse, or horse left un-
attended or untied in street, 49 A.L.R.4th 653. 
Liability of governmental entity for damage 
to motor vehicle or injury to person riding 
therein resulting from collision between vehi-
cle and domestic animal at large in street or 
highway, 52 A.L.R.4th 1200. 
Liability for killing or injuring, by motor ve-
hicle, livestock or fowl on highway, 55 
A.L.R.4th 822. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ec> 10. 
41-6-38.5. Peace officer investigating accident to notify 
owner if livestock or broken fence involved 
Exempt from liability. 
(1) A peace officer investigating an accident resulting in injury or death of 
any livestock shall make reasonable efforts as soon as possible to locate the 
owner of the livestock and inform the owner of the injured or dead animal. 
(2) A peace officer investigating an accident resulting in a broken fence, if 
it appears the fence contains or controls the movement of livestock, shall 
make reasonable efforts as soon as possible to locate the owner of the property 
and inform the owner of the broken fence. 
(3) Civil or criminal liability for claims does not arise against any peace 
officer for failure to locate the owner of the livestock or property. This subsec-
tion does not preclude disciplinary action by the department against a peace 
officer for failure to perform duties required by this section. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-38.5, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 127, § l; 1987, ch. 138, § 31. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation throughout the section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Liability for damage to motor ve-
hicle or injury to person riding therein from 
collision with runaway horse, or horse left un-
attended or untied in street, 49 A.L.R.4th 653. 
41-6-39. Garage keeper to report damaged vehicle without 
damage sticker. 
(1) The person in charge of any garage or repair shop who receives a vehicle 
which shows evidence of having been involved in an accident for which a 
written report may be requested under Section 41-6-35, or having been struck 
by any bullet, shall report the vehicle to the. nearest office of an authorized 
law enforcement agency within 24 hours after the vehicle is received by the 
garage or repair shop, giving the vehicle identification number, registration 
number, and the name and address of the owner or operator of the vehicle. 
(2) , If a damaged vehicle sticker describing the damage is affixed to the 
vehicle, a report under this section is not required. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 29; C. 1943, 
57-7-106; L. 1977, ch. 269, § 5; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 32. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment inserted subsection designations, in Sub-
section (1) substituted "shall report the vehicle 
to the nearest office of an authorized law en-
forcement agent" for "shall report to the local 
police department if such garage is located 
within a municipality, otherwise to the office of 
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county sheriff or the nearest office of the state phraseology and punctuation throughout thi 
highway patrol" and made minor changes in section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 717. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ec> 363. 
41-6-40. Accident reports - When confidential - Insur-
ance policy information - Use as evidence -
Penalty for false information. 
(1) All written reports required in this article to be forwarded to the depart-
ment by operators or owners of vehicles involved in accidents or by garages 
are without prejudice to the reporting individual and are for the confidential 
use of the department or other state agencies having use for the records for 
accident prevention purposes. However, the department may disclose the 
identity of a person involved in an accident when the identity is not otherwise 
known or when the person denies his presence at the accident. The depart-
ment shall disclose whether any person or vehicle involved in an accident 
reported under this section was covered by a vehicle insurance policy, and the 
name of the insurer. 
(2) Written reports forwarded under this section may not be used as evi-
dence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an accident, except that the 
department shall furnish upon demand of any party to the trial or upon de-
mand of any court a certificate showing that a specified accident report has or 
has not been made to the department in compliance with law, and if the report 
has been made, the date, time, and location of the accident, the names and 
addresses of the drivers, the owners of the vehicles involved, and the investi-
gating officers. The reports may be used as evidence when necessary to prose-
cute charges filed in connection with a violation of Subsection (3). 
(3) A person who gives information in oral or written reports as required in 
this chapter knowing or having reason to believe that the information is false 
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-40, enacted by L. 
1979, ch.242, § 10; 1986, ch. 178,§ 28; 1987, 
ch. 138, § 33. 
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1979, 
ch. 242, § 10 repealed former § 41-6-40 (L. 
1941, ch. 52, § 30; C. 1943, 57-7-107; L. 1949, 
ch. 65, § 1), relating to accident reports and 
their use in evidence, and enacted present 
§ 41-6-40. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amend-
ment made minor word changes in Subsections 
(a) and (b) and substituted "is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor" for "shall be fined, upon con-
viction, not more than $1,000, or imprisoned 
for not more than one year, or both" in Subsec-
tion (c). 
The 1987 amendment redesignated the pro-
visions of this section as last amended by Laws 
1986, ch. 178, § 28, in Subsection (1) substi-
tuted "operators" for "drivers" near the begin-
ning and added the present last sentence, and 
made minor changes in phraseology and punc-
tuation throughout the section. 
Cross-References. - Access to accident re-
ports, § 41-12a-202. 
Penalty for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 
76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
41-6-43 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 289 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 43. 
A.L.R. -Admissibility of police officer's tes-
timony at state trial relating to motorist's ad-
missions made in or for automobile accident 
report required by law, 46 A.L.R.4th 291. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <:!=> 10. 
41-6-41. Statistical information regarding accidents -An-
nual publication. 
The department shall tabulate and may analyze all accident reports and 
shall publish annually, or at more frequent intervals, related statistical infor-
mation as to the number and circumstances of traffic accidents. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 31; C. 1943, 
57-7-108; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 34. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment made minor changes in phraseology. 
41-6-42. Local powers to require report. 
A local authority may by ordinance require that the operator of a vehicle 
involved in any accident, or the owner of the vehicle, also file with the desig-
nated municipal department a written report of the accident or a copy of any 
report required under this article to be filed with the department on accidents 
occurring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for the confidential use of the 
municipal department and are subject to Section 41-6-40. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 32; C. 1943, 
57-7-109; L. 1979, ch. 242, § 11; 1987, ch. 138, 
§ 35. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operator" for "driver", sub-
stituted "report required under this article" for 
"report herein required" and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. -Admissibility of police officer's tes-
timony at state trial relating to motorist's ad-
missions made in or for automobile accident 
report required by law, 46 A.L.R.4th 291. 
ARTICLE 5 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND 
RECKLESS DRIVING 
41-6-43. Local DUI and related ordinances and reckless 
driving ordinances - Consistent with code. 
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs a person's oper-
ating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having 
alcohol in the blood or while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any drug, or that governs, in relation to any 
of those matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests, or evidentiary 
presumptions, or penalties, or that governs any combination of those matters, 
shall be consistent with the provisions in this code which govern those mat-
ters. 
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(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs reckless driving, 
or operating a vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons 
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of this code which govern 
those matters. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 99, § 11; 1987, ch. 138, § 36. 
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1978, 
ch. 33, § 54 repealed old§ 41-6-43 (L. 1941, ch. 
52, § 33; C. 1943, 57-7-110; L. 1957, ch. 75, 
§ l; 1967, ch. 88, § l; 1969, ch. 107, § 1), relat-
ing to powers of local authorities as to driving 
while intoxicated and reckless driving, and a 
new § 41-6-43 was enacted by Laws 1979, ch. 
242, § 12. 
Laws 1983, ch. 99, § 11 repealed former 
§ 41-6-43 (L. 1979, ch. 242, § 12), relating to 
powers of local authorities, and enacted 
present § 41-6-43. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "operating" for "driving" 
both places it appears in this section and made 
minor changes in punctuation. 
Cross-References. - Traffic regulations, 
powers and duties of cities as to, § 10-8-30. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Effect of interim repeal. 
Powers of cities. 
Effect of interim repeal. 
The interim repeal of this section did not 
render municipalities without authority to 
enact ordinances prohibiting driving under the 
influence of alcohol as municipalities had au-
thority under their general police powers to 
enact such ordinances in the absence of a spe-
cific legislative grant of authority. Layton City 
v. Glines, 616 P.2d 588 (Utah 1980). 
Powers of cities. 
City held to have power to pass ordinance 
prohibiting driving while intoxicated, notwith-
standing statute on the subject. Salt Lake City 
v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7 A Arn. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 296 et seq. 
41-6-43.10. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Section 41-6-43.10 (L. 1955, ch. 
71, § 1; 1957, ch. 78, § 2; 1983, ch. 99, § 12), 
C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§§ 625 
to 637. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles <P 332. 
relating to negligent homicide, was repealed 
by Laws 1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 2. 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol or drug or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentra-
tion - Measurement of blood or breath alcohol 
- Criminal punishment - Arrest without war• 
rant - Penalties - Suspension or revocation of 
license. 
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this section for any 
person to operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours 
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after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the person is under 
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of alcohol 
and any drug to a degree which renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol 
per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) Every person who is convicted the first time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. But if the person has inflicted a 
bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the 
vehicle in a negligent manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of simple negli-
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care which an ordinarily 
reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circum-
stances. 
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), the court 
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less 
than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240 hours, with emphasis on serving 
in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to work in a community-
service work program for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours and, 
in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service work 
program, order the person to participate in an assessment and educational 
series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction within five years after a first conviction 
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section 
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in addi-
tion to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory 
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 720 
hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require 
the person to work in a community-service work program for not less than 
80 hours nor more than 240 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or 
the work in the community-service work program, order the person to 
participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol 
rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the person 
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(b) Upon a subsequent conviction within five years after a second con-
viction under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this sec-
tion adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the court shall, in 
addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a manda-
tory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160 hours with 
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or require the person to 
work in a community-service work program for not less than 240 nor 
more than 720 hours and, in addition to the jail sentence or work in the 
community-service work program, order the person to obtain treatment 
at an alcohol rehabilitation facility. 
(c) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection (3) may be 
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation 
until any sentence imposed under this section has been served. Probation 
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or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation of this section or a 
local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Subsec-
tion 41-6-43(1) may not be terminated and the department may not rein-
state any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction, if it is 
a second or subsequent conviction within five years, until the convicted 
person has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that all 
fines and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs, as-
sessed against the person, have been paid. 
(6) (a) The provisions in Subsections (4) and (5) that require a sentencing 
court to order a convicted person to: participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility; obtain, in 
the discretion of the court, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; 
or obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or 
do any combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of 
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection (7). The 
court is required to render the same order regarding education or treat-
ment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-45 that quali-
fies as a prior offense under Subsection (7), as the court would render in 
connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent 
conviction requirements of Subsections 41-6-44(4) and (5). 
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction under Section 
41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under Subsection (7), is a 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under this subsection, a previous 
conviction under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered a 
prior conviction. 
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any community-based or 
other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by 
the Department of Social Services. 
(7) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under 
Subsection 41-6-43(1) in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original 
charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall state for the 
record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had 
been consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the 
defendant in connection with the offense. The statement is an offer of 
proof of the facts which shows whether there was consumption of alcohol 
or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with 
the offense. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea of-
fered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section 
41-6-45 as follows. If the court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no 
contest to a charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states 
for the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a combi-
nation of both, by the defendant in connection with the offense, the result-
ing conviction is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 
41-6-45 which is a prior offense for the purposes of Subsection (5). 
(8) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of 
this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
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occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(9) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90 days the opera-
tor's license of any person convicted for the first time under Subsection (1), 
and shall revoke for one year the license of any person convicted of any subse-
quent offense under Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a 
period of five years from the date of the prior violation. The department shall 
subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of days for 
which a license was previously suspended under Section 41-2-130, if the previ-
ous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of 
conviction is based. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 34; C. 1943, 
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75, 
§ l; 1967, ch. 88, § 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, 
ch.268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63, 
§ 2; 1982, ch. 46, § 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, 
ch. 103,§ 1; 1983,ch. 183,§ 33; 1985,ch.46, 
§ 1; 1986, ch. 122, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29; 
1987, ch. 138, § 37; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, § 2; 
1988, ch. 17, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1985 amend-
ment divided Subsection (3) into Subsections 
(3)(a) and (3)(b); deleted "of this section" before 
"shall be punished" in the first sentence of 
Subsection (3)(a); divided the former first sen-
tence of Subsection (3)(a) into the first and sec-
ond sentences, substituting "But" for "except 
that" at the beginning of the second sentence of 
Subsection (3)(a); divided Subsection (5) into 
Subsections (5)(a) through (5)(c); divided the 
former first sentence of Subsection (5)(a) into 
the first and second sentences; substituted 
"may" for "shall" in three places in Subsection 
{5)(c); deleted "such time as" after "probation 
until" in the first sentence of Subsection (5)(c); 
deleted "and unless" before "the convicted per-
son" near the end of Subsection (5)(c); divided 
Subsection (6) into Subsections (6)(a) and 
(6)(b); deleted "of this section" at the end of 
Subsections (7)(b) and (7){c); substituted "the 
officer has probable cause to believe the viola-
tion has occurred" for "the violation is coupled 
with an accident or collision in which the per-
son is involved and when the violation has, in 
fact, been committed" in Subsection (8); substi-
tuted "probable" for "reasonable" near the end 
of Subsection (8); deleted "a period of' before 
"90 days" and "of this section" before "and 
shall revoke" in Subsection (9); and made 
minor changes in phraseology, punctuation, 
and style. 
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 122, 
in Subsection (4) deleted "for" following "pro-
vided" and substituted "240 hours" for "ten 
days", "24 hours" for "two" and "80 hours" for 
"ten days"; in Subsection (5)(a) substituted 
"240" for "48", "720 hours" for "ten days", "80 
hours" for "ten", and "240 hours" for "30 days"; 
and in Subsection (5)(b) substituted "720" for 
"30", "2,160 hours" for "90 days", "240" for 
"30", and "720 hours" for "90 days". 
The 1986 amendment by Laws 1986, ch. 178, 
in Subsection (3)(a), substituted the language 
beginning "is guilty of a class B misdemeanor" 
for "shall be punished by imprisonment for not 
less than 60 days nor more than six months, or 
by a fine of $299, or by both the fine and im-
prisonment" in the first sentence and the lan-
guage beginning "is guilty of a class A misde-
meanor" for "shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the county jail for not more than one 
year, and, in the discretion of the court, by a 
fine of not more than $1,000" in the second 
sentence. 
The 1987 amendment designated the previ-
ously undesignated provisions of Subsection (1) 
as last amended by Laws 1986, ch. 178, § 29 
and rewrote the provisions of Subsection (a) to 
the extent that a detailed analysis is impracti-
cable; in Subsection (2) added the phrase fol-
lowing "centimeters of blood"; in Subsection 
(3)(a) deleted "imprisonment shall be for not 
fewer than 60 days" following "misdemeanor" 
in the first sentence and deleted "any impris-
onment in the county jail shall be for not more 
than one year" at the end of the second sen-
tence; in Subsection (6)(b) deleted "41-6-44 or"; 
in Subsection (7)(a) substituted "41-6-43(1)" for 
"41-6-43(b)"; in Subsection (9) substituted 
"41-2-130" for "41-2-19.6"; and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
This section was set out in 1987 as reconciled 
by the Office of Legislative Research and Gen-
eral Counsel. 
The 1987 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective 
June 5, 1987, substituted "concentration of .08 
grams or greater as shown by a chemical test" 
for "content of .08% or greater by weight as 
shown by a chemical test" in Subsection (1) (a), 
substituted the provisions of Subsection (2) for 
the former provisions which read "Percent by 
weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based 
upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic 
centimeters of blood, and the percent by weight 
of alcohol in the breath shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath", and 
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substituted "community-service work pro-
gram" for "community-service work project" in 
Subsection (5)(b). 
The 1988 amendment, effective March 2, 
1988, divided Subsection (9) into two sentences 
and rewrote the language following "any per-
son," which had read "otherwise convicted un-
der this section, except that the department 
may subtract from arty suspension period the 
number of days for which a license was previ-
ously suspended under Section 41-2-130 if the 
previous suspension was based on the same oc-
currence upon which the record of conviction is 
based." 
Cross-References. - Assessment in addi-
tion to fine upon conviction, use for drinking 
driver rehabilitation program, §§ 63-43-9 to 
63-43-11. 
Assessments to fund intoxicated driver reha-
bilitation account, § 63-43-10. 
Automobile homicide, § 76-5-207. 
Department of health to issue permits for 
drawing of blood, § 26-1-30(19). 
Motorboat or vessel, operating under influ-
ence, § 73-18-12. 
Penalty for tnisdemeanors, §§ 76-3-204, 
76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Actual physical control. 




Conflict between state and city authorities. 
Conflict between state and municipal regulation. 






Presumptions of intoxication. 
Prior convictions. 
-Procedure to be followed where alleged. 
-Proof. 
Probable cause to arrest. 
Proof of intoxication. 










It was within the prerogative of the legisla-
ture to make it unlawful for one to drive ave-
hicle while under the influence of liquor and to 
provide a greater penalty if, while doing so, he 
injured another by recklessness or negligence. 
State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195,371 P.2d 27 
(1962). 
This section did not deal with two separate 
subjects and thus transgress former Utah 
Const., Art. VI, § 23 which required that legis-
lative acts must contain only one subject. State 
v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 
(1962). 
Former § 41-6-44.2 stated with sufficient 
clarity and conciseness the two elements neces-
sary to constitute its violation: a blood alcohol 
concentration of .10%, and concurrent opera-
tion or actual physical control of any vehicle. 
Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 805 (Utah 1974). 
Actual physical control. 
Defendant who was asleep in automobile, 
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completely off traveled portion of highway 
with engine shut off, was not in "actual physi-
cal control" of the vehicle. State v. Bugger, 25 
Utah 2d 404, 483 P.2d 442 (1971). 
Automobile homicide prosecution. 
Presumption of intoxication arising from 
presence of certain amount of alcohol in blood 
was inapplicable to automobile homicide prose-
cution under former statute, and instructing of 
jury on presumption was reversible error. 
State v. Risk, 520 P.2d 215 (Utah 1974). 
Blood-alcohol test. 
After an accused has been lawfully placed 
under arrest it is the duty of the officers to 
make a search for evidence relative to the com-
mission of the crime. The blood-alcohol test is 
designed for that purpose. State v. Bryan, 16 
Utah 2d 47, 395 P.2d 539 (1964). 
-Consent. 
Where officer testified that he obtained the 
defendant's consent to the taking of a blood-al-
cohol test, which fact was also attested by the 
nurse and by the physician who took the blood 
sample, the evidence left no doubt that defen-
dant gave his consent to such a test. State v. 
Bryan, 16 Utah 2d 47, 395 P.2d 539 (1964). 
Breathalyzer affidavit. 
In a driving under the influence of alcohol 
case, a defendant is not denied the constitu-
tional right to confront witnesses by the state's 
introduction of an affidavit for the purpose of 
establishing that the breathalyzer was work-
ing properly. State v. Barneycastle, 699 P.2d 
745 (Utah 1985). 
The use of affidavits to establish the reliabil-
ity and accuracy of breathalyzer evidence in 
court is allowed. Absent such a showing, how-
ever, the court will not presume the accuracy 
and reliability of the breathalyzer results espe-
cially when the evidence is being admitted un-
der § 41-6-44.3, which compromises the right 
of confrontation. Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 
P.2d 413 (Utah 1987). 
Conflict between state and city authorities. 
City held to have power to pass ordinance 
prohibiting driving while intoxicated, notwith-
standing statute on the subject. Salt Lake City 
v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938). 
If city ordinance prescribed the punishment 
for drunken driving as confinement in city jail, 
court or judge was without authority to order 
confinement in county jail. Ex parte Folck, 102 
Utah 470, 132 P.2d 130 (1942). But see now 
§ 41-6-43. 
Conflict between state and municipal regu-
lation. 
Municipal ordinance prohibiting driving un-
der the influence of alcohol was enforceable 
where, although not as extensive as the provi-
sions of the state statute, it did not conflict 
with the state statute. Layton City v. Glines, 
616 P.2d 588 (Utah 1980). 
Delay in arrest. 
Where law enforcement officers on arriving 
at scene of automobile collision found injured 
defendant sitting on curb and took him to a 
nearby hospital for treatment of his wounds 
before making arrest, the delay in the arrest 
was not unreasonable. State v. Bryan, 16 Utah 
2d 47, 395 P.2d 539 (1964). 
Evidence. 
-Hearsay. 
In a proceeding to suspend a driver's license 
the arresting officer's DUI report, the results of 
the breathalyzer test, and the citation were not 
admissible under the public records exception 
to the hearsay rule due to lack of trustworthi-
ness. Harry v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1344 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Included offense. 
Defendant could be prosecuted under this 
section even though he had pleaded guilty to 
driving without a license, without a registra-
tion certificate, and without a safety sticker, 
since each citation charged a separate offense 
entirely unrelated to each other. Hupp v. John-
son, 606 P.2d 253 (Utah 1980). 
Jury question. 
Where evidence is conflicting, it is for the 
jury to say whether defendant was guilty of 
driving a vehicle while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor. State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 
203, 171 P.2d 383 (1946). 
Jury trial. 
Defendants charged with driving under the 
influence of alcohol, a Class B misdemeanor 
with maximum possible imprisonment of six 
months, had no federally protected right to 
jury trial, and therefore could claim no right to 
six-member panel as opposed to four-member 
juries which convicted them. State v. Nuttall, 
611 P.2d 722 (Utah 1980). 
Presumptions of intoxication. 
In cases arising before the enactment of 
§ 41-6-44.5, if state is unable to produce test 
results sufficient to permit a presumption of 
intoxication when the test was given, it must 
provide expert testimony to extrapolate the re-
sults back to the time of the incident to show 
defendant's blood alcohol level was sufficient 
at that time to give rise to the presumption 
before state is entitled to rely on the presump-
tion at trial. State v. Bradley, 578 P.2d 1267 
(Utah 1978). 
Prior convictions. 
-Procedure to be followed where alleged. 
As a guide for future cases, where there is an 
allegation of prior crimes or prior convictions, 
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the Supreme Court has outlined the procedure 
to be followed in the trial courts, which will 
properly expedite the adjudication of such 
cases, while at the same time safeguarding the 
substantial rights of accused persons, and pre-
vent an accused person from being advertised 
to the jury as one who previously perpetrated a 
similar type of offense. State v. Stewart, llO 
Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383 (1946), setting out the 
procedure at length, following Connecticut 
cases. 
Proof. 
Upon trial of information for drunken driv-
ing, introduction of evidence of prior convic-
tions before a determination of the issue on the 
substantive charge, even if erroneous, would 
not warrant directing an acquittal, and evi-
dence of prior conviction is admissible, even 
though conviction followed plea of guilty, and 
may be shown under proper procedure. But 
until a verdict has been rendered on the princi-
pal issue, there is no occasion to mention prior 
convictions, since previous offenses would not 
be competent to prove that defendant commit-
ted the offense for which he is then on trial. 
State v. Stewart, 110 Utah 203, 171 P.2d 383 
(1946), pointing out manner of showing prior 
convictions from the records of justice and city 
courts, notwithstanding informality of proceed-
ings in such courts and lack of judgment book. 
Where the defendant is charged with a prior 
conviction of driving while under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor it is incumbent upon the 
state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the 
prior conviction. It was then the exclusive 
province of the jury to determine from the evi-
dence whether the state had done so. The trial 
court's comments on the evidence and his lim-
iting the jury's deliberation to whether the 
record of the prior conviction was authentic 
was error prejudicial to defendant. State v. 
Harris, 1 Utah 2d 182, 264 P.2d 284, 39 
A.L.R.2d 553 (1953). 
Upon information charging defendant with 
driving under the influence of intoxicating li-
quor and with commission of prior offense, 
where the docket of the justice of the peace was 
received in evidence, the page identified and 
the verity of the entry stipulated to in open 
court as being in the handwriting of the jus-
tice, the entry, under § 78-5-16, became prima 
facie evidence of the facts so stated, and no 
evidence to the contrary having been offered, 
must be presumed to be correct and sustains 
the court's finding of guilt of prior conviction. 
State v. Bailey, 3 Utah 2d 254, 282 P.2d 339 
(1955). 
Probable cause to arrest. 
There was probable cause to arrest defen-
dant for driving under the influence of alcohol, 
where the arresting officer was told by a store 
clerk that defendant had driven up in a car 
parked outside the store and the officer 
watched defendant walk from the store in an 
unsteady manner, smelled alcohol on his 
breath, and caught him before he fell to the 
ground while taking a field sobriety test. Lay-
ton City v. Noon, 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1987) 
(prosecution under identical municipal ordi-
nance). 
Proof of intoxication. 
In a prosecution for automobile homicide 
where there was competent, substantial, ex-
pert testimony that defendant's alcohol-blood 
content was not only 0.15, but 0.224, which 
would impair motor and sensory reactions, an 
instruction by the court that 0.15 alcohol-blood 
content raised a presumption that one would 
be under the influence was not prejudicial. 
State v. Romero, 12 Utah 2d 210, 364 P.2d 828 
(1961). 
Proof to sustain conviction. 
Under former provision "operating an auto-
mobile on a public street or highway by one 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor is it-
self an unlawful act and an offense." But a con-
viction of involuntary manslaughter will be re-
versed unless the charge is sufficiently proven. 
State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 287 P. 909 
(1930), overruled on other grounds, State v. 
Crank, 105 Utah 332, 355, 142 P.2d 178, 170 
A.L.R. 542 (1943). 
-Insufficient. 
Testimony that three or four hours after ac-
cident liquor was detected by odor on defen-
dant's breath does not prove the charge of 
drunken driving, and driving an automobile in 
violation of traffic rules or ordinances in one or 
more particulars, or driving it negligently or 
even recklessly, resulting in an accident, does 
not relevantly tend to prove that the driver 
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
State v. Johnson, 76 Utah 84, 287 P. 909 
(1930), overruled on other grounds, State v. 
Crank, 105 Utah 332, 355, 142 P.2d 178, 170 
A.L.R. 542 (1943). 
Where the hearing examiner suspended peti-
tioner's driver's license based on the arresting 
officer's sworn driving under the influence re-
port (DUI), the results of the breathalyzer test, 
and the citation, since the breathalyzer test re-
sults were inadmissible and that portion of the 
DUI report indicating breathalyzer results was 
also inadmissible because oflack of evidence of 
proper maintenance of the breathalyzer or 
competence of the test giver, then without ad-
missible evidence demonstrating petitioner's 
blood alcohol content was .08% or greater, the 
department's decision to suspend the license 
was arbitrary and capricious, there being no 
submission of evidence indicating that peti-
tioner was incapable of safe driving. Harry v. 
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Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1344 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
Where, in proceedings before a hearing ex-
aminer, the arresting officer's testimony did 
not include statements regarding the calibra-
tion or maintenance of the intoxilyzer, nor 
were there any affidavits submitted regarding 
that issue, there is no indication that the intox-
ilyzer test was performed in accordance with 
the standards established by the commissioner 
of public safety, and the arresting officer's 
statement that there was "no problem" with 
the equipment is insufficient. Since references 
to the intoxilyzer test in the DUI report were 
inadmissible and should have been stricken, 
the hearing examiner's decision to suspend ap-
pellant's license was not based on a residuum 
o'f evidence competent in a court of law. Wil-
liams v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1354 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
-Sufficient. 
Conviction of the crime of involuntary man-
slaughter as the result of a collision between 
an automobile, which defendant was driving, 
and a pedestrian was upheld, where evidence 
showed that he had imbibed to such a degree 
that it was apparent to all who saw and heard 
him that his locomotion and his power of 
speech were markedly affected, and it ap-
peared that such criminal negligence contrib-
uted to the death. A person who drives a car 
while in such a condition is reckless and 
evinces a marked disregard for the safety of 
others and is therefore guilty of criminal negli-
gence. State v. Capps, 111 Utah 189, 176 P.2d 
873 (1947). 
Breathalyzer test reading of .27 was suffi-
cient to sustain the findings of the trial court 
that defendant had operated his vehicle in a 
willful and wanton disregard for the safety of 
others. Ellefsen v. Robert, 526 P.2d 912 (Utah 
1974). 
Evidence was sufficient to sustain defen-
dant's conviction, where he had been driving 
erratically prior to a collision and made 
unsolicited, voluntary statements while not in 
custody. In re RLI, 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
Public intoxication. 
Following an automobile collision defendant 
was sitting on curb holding a handkerchief to 
his head which was bleeding; there was a 
strong odor of alcohol on his breath; he ap-
peared to be intoxicated, and stated that he 
was drunk. A bottle containing whiskey was 
found on the floor of his automobile. He was 
taken to a nearby hospital where his wounds 
were attended and he was placed under arrest 
under this section for operating a motor vehicle 
while intoxicated. Under such circumstances 
arrest of defendant was justified though of-
fense for which he was arrested was not com-
mitted in the presence of the arresting officer, 
the defendant being intoxicated in a public 
place in violation of the law, and upon death of 
his passengers, he was charged with automo-
bile homicide under former § 76-30-7.4. State 
v. Bryan, 16 Utah 2d 47, 395 P.2d 539 (1964). 
Punitive damages. 
Punitive damages are recoverable against a 
drunken driver in an automobile personal in-
jury case where it can be established: (1) that 
the defendant motorist acted with actual mal-
ice or a reckless disregard of the rights and 
safety of others; and (2) that his drunken driv-
ing was a contributing cause of the accident; 
but the mere finding that a driver who was 
involved in an accident was convicted for driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol in violation 
of this section would not allow the issue of pu-
nitive damages to be submitted to the jury. 
Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
-Double jeopardy. 
The imposition of punitive damages against 
a drunken driver in a civil action, who may 
also be punished criminally for the same con-
duct, does not violate the double jeopardy pro-
hibition in Utah's Constitution. Biswell v. 
Duncan, 742 P.2d 80 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Riding horse. 
The defendant's conviction of operating a ve-
hicle under the influence of alcohol denied him 
due process of law because this section does not 
give him adequate notice that being intoxi-
cated while riding a horse was a crime. The 
definition of "vehicle" in § 41-6-1(53) cannot 
be legitimately read to include horses. State v. 
Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986). 
Venue. 
Where the testimony adequately established 
where the offense was committed, the court 
will take judicial notice that that point is in 
the county so that the venue has been suffi-
ciently established. State v. Bailey, 3 Utah 2d 
254, 282 P.2d 339 (1955). 
Cited in State v. Chugg, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 
67 (Ct. App. 1988). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative 
Survey - 1979, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 155. 
Utah Legislative Survey - 1983, 1984 Utah 
L. Rev. 115, 175. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law, 1986 
Utah L. Rev. 95, 96. 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic §§ 296 to 311. 
C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 628. 
A.L.R. - Intoxication from specified per-
centage of alcohol present in system, construc-
tion and application of statutes creating pre-
sumption or other inference, 16 A.L.R.3d 748. 
Drugs, driving under the influence, or when 
addicted to use of as criminal offense, 17 
A.L.R.3d 815. 
Applicability, to operation of motor vehicle 
on private property, of legislation making 
drunken driving a criminal offense, 29 
A.L.R.3d 938. 
What constitutes driving, operating, or being 
in control of motor vehicle for purposes of driv-
ing while intoxicated statute or ordinance, 93 
A.L.R.3d 7. 
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of 
liability of state or local governmental unit or 
officer, 48 A.L.R.4th 287. 
Validity, construction, and application of 
statutes directly proscribing driving with 
blood-alcohol level in excess of established per-
centage, 54 A.L.R.4th 149. 
Snowmobile operation as DWI or DUI, 56 
A.L.R.4th 1092. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ea, 332. 
41-6-44.1. Procedures - Adjudicative proceedings. 
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with the procedures and 
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its adjudicative proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.1, enacted by L. § 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
1987, ch. 161, § 142. 1988. 
Effective Dates. - Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
41-6-44.2. Repealed. 
Repeals. - Section 41-6-44.2 (L. 1973, ch. 
80, § 2; 1982 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 2), relating to 
driving with blood alcohol content of .10% or 
higher, was repealed by Laws 1983, ch. 99, 
§ 21. 
41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis - Evi-
dence. 
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety shall establish 
standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a 
person's breath, including standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person 
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influ-
ence of alcohol or any drug or operating with a blood or breath alcohol content 
statutorily prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of acts, 
conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made and the instrument 
used was accurate, according to standards established in Subsection (1), are 
admissible if: 
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular course of the 
investigation at or about the time of the act, condition, or event; and 
(b) the source of information from which made and the method and 
circumstances of their preparation indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under Subsection (1) 
and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been met, there is a presumption 
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that the test results are valid and further foundation for introduction of the 
evidence is unnecessary. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.3, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 243, § 2; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 14; 1987, 
ch. 138, § 38. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (2) substituted "operating" 
for "driving" both places it appears, inserted 
"or any drug" following "influence of alcohol," 
inserted "or breath" following "with a blood" 
and made minor changes in phraseology and 
punctuation throughout the section. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 









Given the legitimate governmental interest 
in not having to produce in every DUI case the 
public officer responsible for testing the accu-
racy of the breathalyzer and the ampoules, and 
the alternative means available to an accused 
to cross-examine and confront such a witness, 
this section does not violate the constitutional 
right of confrontation when all of its require-
ments are met. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 
1314 (Utah 1983). 
The procedure by which breath testing ma-
chines are checked is not so inaccurate as to be 
a violation of a defendant's due process rights. 
Layton City v. Watson, 733 P.2d 499 (Utah 
1987). 
Ampoules used in test. 
Since the ampoules used in the testing are 
such an integral part of the breathalyzer 
equipment, this section applies to such am-
poules. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 
(Utah 1983). 
Breathalyzer affidavits. 
The use of affidavits to establish the reliabil-
ity and accuracy of breathalyzer evidence in 
court is allowed. Absent such a showing, how-
ever, the court will not presume the accuracy 
and reliability of the breathalyzer results espe-
cially when the evidence is being admitted un-
der this section, which compromises the right 
of confrontation. Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 
P.2d 413 (Utah 1987). 
Intoxilyzer testing affidavits were admissi-
ble, where the facts stated therein were based 
upon the affiant's personal knowledge and ob-
servation as the person who conducted the ma-
chine testing procedures, and not upon some-
one else's hearsay information. Layton City v. 
Bennett, 741 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Findings required. 
Prior to the acceptance of affidavits to estab-
lish a presumption of validity of the test re-
sults, this section requires an affirmative find-
ing by the trial court that the calibration and 
testing for accuracy of the breathalyzer and the 
ampoules were performed in accordance with 
the standards established by the commissioner 
of public safety, the affidavits were prepared in 
the regular course of the public officer's duties, 
that they were prepared contemporaneously 
with the act, condition or event, and the source 
of information from which made and the 
method and circumstances of their preparation 
were such as to indicate their trustworthiness; 
affidavits were inadmissible where the record 
was devoid of such findings and where the affi-
davits showed on their face that the affiants 
did not attest from their own personal knowl-
edge. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 
(Utah 1983). 
Hearsay exception. 
So long as there is compliance with the man-
dates of this section, namely, contemporaneous 
preparation in accordance with established 
standards, in the regular course of the officer's 
duties, and indications oftrusthworthiness, the 
affidavits regarding the maintenance of a 
breathalyzer machine are admissible under 
this section as a valid statutory exception to 
the hearsay rule. Murray City v. Hall, 663 
P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983). 
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Inadmissible tests. 
A breathalyzer test result was inadmissible 
where an operational checklist, which was the 
only foundation for admission of the test result, 
was excluded for lack of a proper foundation. 
Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413 (Utah 
1987). 
Proof to sustain conviction. 
-Insufficient. 
Where, in proceedings before a hearing ex-
aminer, the arresting officer's testimony did 
not include statements regarding the calibra-
tion or maintenance of the intoxilyzer, nor 
were there any affidavits submitted regarding 
that issue, there is no indication that the intox-
ilyzer test was performed in accordance with 
the standards established by the commissioner 
of public safety, and the arresting officer's 
statement that there was "no problem" with 
the equipment is insufficient. Since references 
to the intoxilyzer test in the DUI report were 
inadmissible and should have been stricken, 
the hearing examiner's decision to suspend ap-
pellant's license was not based on a residuum 
of evidence competent in a court of law. Wil-
liams v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1354 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
Rebuttable presumption. 
Affidavits in compliance with the mandates 
of this section establish a rebuttable presump-
tion that the breathalyzer machine was func-
tioning properly. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 
1314 (Utah 1983). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. - Necessity and sufficiency of proof 
that tests of blood alcohol concentration were 
conducted in conformance with prescribed 
methods, 96 A.L.R.3d 745. 
41-6-44.5. Admissibility of chemical test results in actions 
for driving under the influence - Weight of evi-
dence. 
(1) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to prove that a person 
was operating or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influ-
ence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, the results of a chemical test or tests as authorized in Section 
41-6-44.10 are admissible as evidence. 
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after the alleged 
driving or actual physical control, the test result is admissible as evidence of 
the person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of the alleged operating 
or actual physical control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight is 
given to the result of the test. 
(3) This section does not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissi-
ble evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at 
the time of the alleged operating or actual physical control. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.5, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 243, § 3; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 15; 1987, 
ch. 138, § 39. 
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1979, 
ch. 243, § 3 repealed former section 41-6-44.5 
(L. 1977, ch. 270, § 1), relating to chemical 
tests as evidence and the presumption of blood 
alcohol level, and enacted present section 
41-6-44.5. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment in Subsection (1) substituted "operating" 
for "driving," inserted "or drugs" following 
"under the influence of alcohol," inserted "or 
breath" following "with a blood"; deleted for-
mer Subsection (2) from this section as last 
amended by Laws 1983, ch. 99, § 15, relating 
to the time of taking the chemical test; redesig-
nated the subsequent subsection numbers; in 
Subsection (2) inserted "or breath" following 
"evidence of the person's blood" and substi-
tuted "operating" for "driving"; in Subsection 
(3) substituted "or breath alcohol level or drug 
level" for "alcohol level" and substituted "oper-
ating" for "driving"; and made minor changes 
in phraseology and punctuation throughout 
the section. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
41-6-44.10 
Relation back of test results. 
Results of chemical analysis test were not 
required to be extrapolated back to the time of 
the incident by expert testimony to be admissi-
ble as evidence. State v. Bradley, 578 P.2d 
1267 (Utah 1978). 
41-6-44.8. Municipal attorneys for specified offenses may 
prosecute for driving while license suspended or 
revoked. 
Alleged violations of Section 41-2-136, which consist of the person operating 
a vehicle while his operator's license is suspended or revoked for a violation of 
Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies with the requirements of 
Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Section 76-5-207, or a criminal prohibi-
tion that the person was charged with violating as a result of a plea bargain 
after having been originally charged with violating one or more of those 
sections or ordinances, may be prosecuted by attorneys of cities and towns as 
well as by prosecutors who are empowered elsewhere in this code to prosecute 
those alleged violations. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.8, enacted by L. 
1983, ch. 102, § l; 1987, ch. 138, § 40. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment substituted "41-2-136" for "41-2-28," sub-
stituted "person operating a vehicle" for "per-
son driving" and deleted "or chauffeur's" fol-
lowing "while his operator's." 
41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or 
drug - Number of tests - Refusal - Warning, 
report - Hearing, revocation of license - Ap-
peal - Person incapable of refusal - Results of 
test available - Who may give test - Evidence. 
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to 
have given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or 
urine for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44, if the test is or tests are administered at the direction of a peace 
officer having grounds to believe that person to have been operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath 
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 
41-6-44. 
(b) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered 
and how many of them are administered, except the officer shall request 
that either the blood or urine test be administered under Section 
76-5-207. If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to 
take one or more requested tests, even though he does submit to any other 
requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section. 
(c) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to a 
chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select the test 
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or tests to be administered. The failure or inability of a peace officer to 
arrange for any specific test is not a defense to taking a test requested by 
a peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or adminis-
trative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit to the re-
quested test or tests. 
(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, and has then been re-
quested by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemical 
tests under Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to the chemical test or 
any one or all of the tests requested, the person shall be warned by a 
peace officer requesting the test or tests that a refusal to submit to the 
test or tests can result in revocation of his license to operate a motor 
vehicle. Following this warning, unless the person immediately requests 
that the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace officer be adminis-
tered, no test may be given. A peace officer shall serve on the person, on 
behalf of the division, immediate notice of the division's intention to re-
voke the person's privilege or license to operate a motor vehicle. If the 
officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of the division, he shall: 
(i) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of the opera-
tor; 
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 30 days; and 
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form approved by the division, 
basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing before the divi-
sion. A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form 
by the division, serve also as the temporary license. The peace officer 
shall submit a signed report, within five days after the date of the 
arrest, that he had grounds to believe the arrested person had been 
operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited or 
while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combination of 
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44 and that the person had 
refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under Subsection (1). 
(b) A person who has been notified of the division's intention to revoke 
his license under this section is entitled to a hearing. A request for the 
hearing shall be made in writing, and within ten days after the date of 
the arrest. Within 20 days after receiving a written request, the division 
shall notify the person of his opportunity to be heard as early as practica-
ble. If the person does not make a timely written request for a hearing 
before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in Utah shall 
be revoked for a period of one year beginning on the 31st day after the 
date of arrest. 
(c) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the divi-
sion, and the division determines that the person was requested to submit 
to a chemical test or tests and refused to submit to the test or tests, or if 
the person fails to appear before the division as required in the notice, the 
division shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in 
Utah for one year, beginning on the date the hearing is held. The division 
shall also assess against the person, in addition to any fee imposed under 
Subsection 41-2-112(6), a fee under Section 41-2-103, which shall be paid 
before the person's driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative 
costs. The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed court 
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decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection that the 
revocation was improper. 
(d) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the division un-
der this section may seek judicial review. 
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a 
trial. Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person 
resides. 
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition render-
ing him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is consid-
ered to not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the 
test or tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not. 
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or 
tests shall be made available to him . 
. (5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Subsection 26-1-30(19), acting at the request of a peace offi-
cer, may withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This 
limitation does not apply to the taking of a urine or breath specimen. 
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person autho-
rized under Subsection 26-1-30(19) who, at the direction of a peace officer, 
draws a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason 
to believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical 
facility at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or crimi-
nal liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered 
according to standard medical practice. 
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of 
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests 
administered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect 
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a 
peace officer, or preclude or delay the test or tests to be taken at the 
direction of a peace officer. 
(c) The additional test shall be subsequent to the test or tests adminis-
tered at the direction of a peace officer. 
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical test or 
tests, the person to be tested does not have the right to consult an attorney or 
have an attorney, physician, or other person present as a condition for the 
taking of any test. 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or 
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have 
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or combi-
nation of alcohol and any drug. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.10, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 126, § 43; L. 1983, ch. 99, § 16; 
1987, ch. 129, § 3; 1987, ch. 138, § 41; 1987, 
ch. 161, § 143; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, §§ 3, 4; 
1988, ch. 148, § 1. 
Repeals and Enactments. - Laws 1981, 
ch. 126, § 43 repealed former § 41-6-44.10 (L. 
1957, ch. 80, §[1]; 1959, ch. 65, § 1; 1967, ch. 
88, § 3; 1969, ch. 107, § 3; 1977, ch. 268, § 4), 
relating to implied consent to tests, and en-
acted present § 41-6-44.10. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment, by Chapter 129, rewrote the provisions 
of Subsection (2) as last amended by Laws 
1983, ch. 99, § 16 to the extent that a detailed 
analysis is impracticable and made minor 
changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the entire section. 
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The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 138, des-
ignated the previously undesignated provi-
sions of Subsections (1), (2) and (5) as last 
amended by Laws 1983, ch. 99, § 16; in Sub-
section (l)(a) substituted "operating" for "driv-
ing" in two places and inserted "or breath" 
both places it appears; in Subsection (l)(b) sub-
stituted the present language for "the peace 
officer shall determine which of the aforesaid 
tests shall be administered"; in Subsection 
(2)(a) substituted "chemical test or any one or 
all of the tests requested" for "chemical test or 
tests" and "operating" for "driving," and in-
serted "or breath" following "while having a 
blood"; in Subsection (2)(b) substituted "oper-
ate" for "drive" and "Subsection 41-2-112(6), a 
fee under Section 41-2-103" for "Subsection 
41-2-8(7), a fee of $25"; in Subsection (2)(c) sub-
stituted "circuit court" for "district court" and 
"trial upon ten days" for "trial de novo upon 
ten days"; in Subsection (8) inserted "or any 
additional test" following "chemical test or 
tests" and substituted "operating'' for "driv-
ing"; and made minor changes in phraseology 
and punctuation throughout the section. 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 161, effec-
tive January 1, 1988, added the paragraph des-
ignations within Subsections (1), (2), (5) and 
(6), substituted "file a notice of agency action 
notifying the person that he has a right to a 
hearing" for "notify the person of a hearing'' in 
Subsection (2)(c), substituted "may seek judi-
cial review" for "shall have the right to file a 
petition within 30 days thereafter for a hearing 
in the matter" in Subsection (2)(f)(i), substi-
tuted the language of Subsection (2)(f)(ii) for a 
former provision relating to trial de novo, and 
made minor changes in phraseology and punc-
tuation. 
This section was set out in 1987 as reconciled 
by the Office of Legislative Research and Gen-
eral Counsel. 
The 1987 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective 
June 5, 1987, substituted "are administered" 
for "shall be administered" in the first sentence 
in Subsection (l)(b); substituted "can result" 
for "may result" near the end of the first sen-
tence in Subsection (2)(a); in Subsection (2)(b), 
added the first two sentences, deleted "and that 
his request shall be made within ten days after 
the date of arrest" from the end of the present 
third sentence, and substituted "was re-
quested" for "was granted the right" in the 
fifth sentence; in Subsection (2)(c), substituted 
"the district court" for "the circuit court" in the 
first sentence. 
The 1987 (1st S.S.) amendment, effective 
January 1, 1988, amended the section as de-
scribed in the preceding paragraph, except 
Subsection (2)(c), which was rewritten. 
The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 
1988, added "except the officer shall request 
that either the blood or urine test be adminis-
tered under Section 76-5-207" in the first sen-
tence in Subsection (l)(b); divided former Sub-
section (2)(b) into present Subsections (2)(b) 
and (2)(c); redesignated former Subsection 
(2)(c) as Subsection (2)(d); and made a minor 
change in punctuation. 
Cross-References. - Chemical tests as evi-
dence of intoxication, § 41-6-44.5. 
Department of health to issue permits for 
drawing of blood, § 26-1-30(19). 
Motorboat or vessel, operating under influ-
ence, § 73-18-12. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
-Standing to raise. 
Actual physical control. 
Administration of test. 
Chemical test. 
-Intoxilizer. 
Civil nature of statute. 
Conditional consent. 
Evidence. 
Grounds for requesting test. 
Immediate request. 
Miranda warning. 
Prerequisites for admission into evidence. 
Presence of counsel. 
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Required submission to test. 
-Self-incrimination. 
Right to refuse test. 
Stay of license suspension. 
Sworn report of arresting officer. 
Trial de novo in district court. 
Warrantless search allowed. 
Cited. 
Constitutionality. 
-Standing to raise. 
Motorist who submitted to blood-alcohol test 
and was convicted of driving while intoxicated 
had no standing to challenge constitutionality 
of this section, not having been convicted un-
der or by reason of it. Salt Lake City v. Per-
kins, 9 Utah 2d 317, 343 P.2d 1106 (1959). 
Actual physical control. 
To establish actual physical control of a vehi-
cle for purposes of this section, it is unneces-
sary t.o show actual intent to control the vehi-
cle; intent to control a vehicle may be inferred 
from the performance of those acts which con-
stitute actual physical control. Garcia v. 
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982). 
There was an adequate showing that motor-
ist was in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle where motorist occupied the driver's 
position behind the steering wheel of a motor 
vehicle with possession of the ignition key and 
with apparent ability to start and move the 
vehicle; fact that vehicle was blocked by a 
fence and another vehicle and could be moved 
only a few feet did not preclude a finding of 
actual physical control. Garcia v. 
Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 (Utah 1982). 
The "actual physical control" language of 
this section should be read as intending to pre-
vent intoxicated drivers from entering their 
vehicles except as passengers or passive occu-
pants. Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 
(Utah 1982). 
Positioning in the driver's seat is an element 
common to all of the cases that have found ac-
tual physical control of a motionless vehicle. 
Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 
1986). 
Administration of test. 
An officer administering a breathalyzer test 
under this section can require an arrested per-
son t.o furnish what the officer reasonably be-
lieves to be a viable sample, and the "green 
light" that is activated when 55 c.c's of breath 
have been acquired is merely an aid in making 
that determination. Powell v. Cox, 608 P.2d 
239 (Utah 1980). 
Chemical test. 
-Intoxilizer. 
A test administered through an intoxilizer, 
or breath test machine, qualifies as a chemical 
test, invoking the prov1s1ons of the implied 
consent law. Collier v. Schwendiman, 709 P.2d 
357 (Utah 1985). 
Civil nature of statute. 
Implied consent provisions are obviously 
civil in nature, as opposed to criminal, since 
they are devoid of criminal sanctions and pro-
vide only for revocation of the privilege of oper-
ating a motor vehicle, and since administrative 
hearing may be had subsequent t.o the test fol-
lowed by trial de novo. Cavaness v. Cox, 598 
P.2d 349 (Utah 1979). 
Conditional consent. 
Defendant had no right to impose any condi-
tions as a prerequisite to giving consent, and 
demanding any unreasonable or impractical 
conditions as a prerequisite was a refusal to 
give consent. Moran v. Shaw, 580 P.2d 241 
(Utah 1978). 
Evidence. 
Prior to the enactment of this section it was 
held, in an action against the estate of a de-
ceased for injuries arising out of an automobile 
accident, that the testimony of a doctor who 
made a blood test from blood taken from the 
deceased's body without the consent of the de-
ceased's parents was admissible in evidence. 
Fretz v. Anderson, 5 Utah 2d 290, 300 P.2d 642 
(1956). 
Where defendant was injured in an automo-
bile accident and taken to a hospital where a 
physician directed a medical technologist to 
draw a blood sample for cross-matching, and a 
police officer directed the taking of a sample 
for a blood alcohol test, the results of which 
showed a blood alcohol level of .13%, results of 
the test were properly admitted into evidence 
at defendant's subsequent prosecution under 
§ 76-5-207(1) for automobile homicide, because 
the test was done at the direction and under 
the supervision of defendant's doctor. State v. 
Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056 (Utah 1977). 
In a trial de novo, the district court must 
determine by a preponderance of the evidence 
whether the petitioner's license is subject to 
revocation under the provisions of this chapter. 
Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 
1986). 
Grounds for requesting test. 
Due process requires that peace officer must 
have reasonable grounds for his belief that the 
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person requested to submit to the chemical test 
was driving or in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while under the influence of al-
cohol or drugs; reasonable grounds exist where 
the facts and circumstances within the officer's 
knowledge and of which he had reasonably 
trustworthy information are sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution in the belief that the situation exists. 
Ballard v. State, Motor Vehicle Div., 595 P.2d 
1302 (Utah 1979). 
Immediate request. 
Driver's request is not "immediate" where he 
makes it after several refusals and after the 
police officer administering the test had shut 
the machine down and left the room. 
Whitehouse v. Schwendiman, 723 P.2d 1084 
(Utah 1986). 
Miranda warning. 
Rights explained in a Miranda warning to 
remain silent and to consult an attorney do not 
apply to the decision to take a chemical test; it 
is incumbent on the arresting officer to explain 
this unequivocally to the motorist, and ques-
tions of whether he did so explain it and 
whether the motorist was confused and mani-
fested his confusion to the arresting officer are 
for the trier of fact to determine. Holman v. 
Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1979); Muir v. Cox, 
611 P.2d 384 (Utah 1980). 
Since license revocation proceeding was not 
a crim;nal proceeding, fact that officer who ar-
rested motorist and requested him to take 
breathalyzer test did not give him Miranda 
warning did not render officer's testimony in-
admissible in the revocation proceeding. Smith 
v. Cox, 609 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1980). 
Prerequisites for admission into evidence. 
Chemical test could not be taken without 
driver's consent prior to his arrest, so that dis-
trict court erred in admitting results of test in 
prosecution for automobile homicide where de-
fendant had objected to taking of blood sample 
and was not, at time blood sample was ex-
tracted, under arrest. State v. Cruz, 21 Utah 2d 
406, 446 P.2d 307 (1968). 
Presence of counsel. 
Person had no right to presence of counsel 
during taking of, or as condition of taking, any 
test. Cavaness v. Cox, 598 P.2d 349 (Utah 
1979); Holman v. Cox, 598 P.2d 1331 (Utah 
1979). 
Preservation of test samples. 
Law enforcement agencies are not required 
by the federal constitution to take a separate 
breath specimen and preserve that sample for 
possible use by the defense in attempting to 
challenge the breath test results. Layton City 
v. Watson, 733 P.2d 499 (Utah 1987). 
Proceeding to revoke license for failure to 
submit to test. 
Acquittal of the defendant under the crimi-
nal charge of driving under the influence is not 
a bar to revocation of the driver's license for 
failure to submit to a chemical test when re-
quested to do so. Ballard v. State, Motor Vehi-
cle Div., 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979). 
At a proceeding to revoke a driver's license 
for failure to submit to a chemical test when so 
requested, driver is entitled to procedural due 
process, although not to the same protections 
afforded a defendant in a criminal prosecution, 
is not required to post bond nor appear at the 
administrative hearing, cannot be fined or im-
prisoned either for his refusal to submit to a 
test or for his failure to appear at the hearing, 
and if he fails to appear or it is determined at 
the hearing that he was granted the right to 
submit to a chemical test and refused, the de-
partment's authority is limited to revocation of 
the driver's license for one year. Ballard v. 
State, Motor Vehicle Div., 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 
1979). 
The purpose of the administrative proceed-
ing to revoke a driver's license for failure to 
submit to a chemical test is to protect the pub-
lic, not to punish drunken drivers; such drivers 
are subject to separate criminal prosecution for 
purposes of punishment. Ballard v. State, Mo-
tor Vehicle Div., 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 1979). 
The rule that the corpus delicti of the crime 
must be established by evidence independent 
of the accused's confession is not applicable to a 
proceeding to revoke a driver's license for fail-
ure to submit to a chemical test since such pro-
ceeding is not criminal in nature. Ballard v. 
State, Motor Vehicle Div., 595 P.2d 1302 (Utah 
1979). 
Driver's license revocation proceeding for 
failure to submit to a requested chemical test 
requires proof only by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 
651 (Utah 1982). 
At a proceeding to revoke a driver's license 
for failure to submit to a requested chemical 
test, department of public safety has the bur-
den to show arrested person was driving or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle in 
addition to showing that the arresting officer 
had grounds to believe that the arrested person 
was under the influence; the same evidentiary 
burden must be met in a trial de novo in the 
district court. Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 
P.2d 651 (Utah 1982). 
Reasonable refusal. 
This section as amended in 1977 precluded 
the defense of "reasonable refusal" as was con-
templated by prior cases and now provides for 
a simple "yes" or "no" to the officer's request to 
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Refusal to submit to test. 
Where arrested motorist did not take a test 
because of his having taken time to reach his 
attorney and make up his mind whether to 
submit, he had not "refused a chemical test" 
and order revoking his driver's license was not 
authorized. Hunter v. Dorius, 23 Utah 2d 122, 
458 P.2d 877 (1969). 
Driver arrested for driving while under the 
influence of intoxicating liquors, advised of 
this law and of his constitutional rights, but 
who pretends not to understand, refuses to 
take breathalyzer test, and presents no reason-
able cause for refusing to submit, has his 
driver's license properly revoked as required 
by Jaw. McCall v. Dorius, 527 P.2d 647 (Utah 
1974). 
The question of revocation of plaintiffs 
driver's license for refusal to submit to a blood-
alcohol test was rendered moot by the failure of 
the state to provide a "duly authorized labora-
tory technician"; drawing blood for the test 
constitutes the practice of medicine and a tech-
nician performing the test is not duly autho-
rized unless acting under the supervision or 
direction of a medical practitioner. Gibb v. 
Dorius, 533 P.2d 299 (Utah 1975), distin-
guished, State v. Durrant, 561 P.2d 1056 (Utah 
1977). 
Where, upon arrest for driving while intoxi-
cated, officer asked defendant whether he 
would submit to a "chemical test," and defen-
dant replied that he would take a blood test 
and that he wanted his physician present, to 
both of which requests the officer agreed, sub-
sequent failure to take blood test due to un-
availability of physician and defendant's re-
fusal to submit to breathalyzer test adminis-
tered by arresting officer did not justify revoca-
tion of defendant's license. Gassman v. Dori us, 
543 P.2d 197 (Utah 1975). 
Plaintiff who, upon being arrested for driv-
ing while intoxicated, agreed in principle to 
submit to the test required by this section, but 
at police station refused to take it until her 
attorney was present, did not refuse to submit 
within the meaning of the statute where it ap-
peared that she called her attorney and he 
made a bona fide effort to appear within a rea-
sonable time, but the police officer grew tired 
of waiting and left without administering the 
test; therefore, driver license division was not 
justified in revoking plaintiffs license to drive. 
Peterson v. Dorius, 547 P.2d 693 (Utah 1976). 
Where plaintiff, immediately upon being ar-
rested after she was involved in an accident, 
and while still agitated and upset, was in-
formed of the provisions of the implied consent 
law and replied that the police officers did not 
know what they were talking about, she did 
not expressly refuse to take the test required 
by this section, and the subsequent suspension 
of her driver's license on that ground was 
error. Hyde v. Dorius, 549 P.2d 451 (Utah 
1976). 
Police officers need not follow exactly the se-
quence of events set out in this section; lan-
guage of statute indicating that notification of 
consequences should be given after refusal to 
submit to test did not impose requirement that 
officer proceed in exactly that fashion, and offi-
cer's notification to defendant of consequences 
of refusal prior to obtaining his answer as to 
whether he would submit did not constitute 
noncompliance with the statute. Elliott v. 
Dorius, 557 P.2d 759 (Utah 1976). 
The fact that defendant believed the breath 
test to be unreliable, and therefore refused to 
submit to it, did not constitute "reasonable 
cause" for refusal within the contemplation of 
the statute. Elliott v. Dorius, 557 P.2d 759 
(Utah 1976). 
Express verbal refusal is not necessary to 
withdraw the consent implied by the statute, 
which is only a fictional consent anyway; a re-
fusal in fact, regardless of the words that ac-
company it, can be as convincing as an express 
verbal refusal, and that includes playing ver-
bal games with the officer to avoid a direct re-
fusal. Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1979). 
Revocation of license was supported by sub-
stantial, competent, uncontradicted evidence 
that driver gave an explicit verbal refusal to 
take chemical test after being properly 
warned. Miles v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1344 (Utah 
1979). 
Motorist's refusal to take blood test until he 
could call his lawyer constituted refusal under 
the statute and a valid basis for revocation of 
his license. Fjelsted v. Cox, 611 P.2d 382 (Utah 
1980). 
Where officer informed motorist of the conse-
quences of a refusal to take the breath test, 
that the test would not be valid unless motorist 
removed his chewing gum from his mouth, and 
that refusal to remove the gum would be con-
sidered a refusal to submit to the test, motor-
ist's refusal to remove the gum after agreeing 
to take the test constituted a knowing and vol-
untary refusal to submit to the test since mo-
torist refused to do that which was necessary 
for a valid test. Mathie v. Schwendiman, 656 
P.2d 463 (Utah 1982). 
Where driver was denied a breathalyzer test 
after having failed to comply with repeated re-
quests to submit to the test, and then later re-
quested the test after being transported to jail, 
the driver was deemed to have effectively re-
fused to take the test, and therefore the resul-
tant suspension of his driver's license was 
proper. Conrad v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 736 
(Utah 1984). 
Where an officer spent approximately 30 
minutes attempting to persuade plaintiff to 
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submit to a test, but plaintiff steadfastly re-
fused, and plaintiff's "request" for a test did not 
come until some 15 to 20 minutes after his 
final refusal and after the intoxilyzer machine 
had been shut down, plaintiff's request for a 
test did not vitiate his refusal. Baker v. 
Schwendiman, 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986). 
A refusal simply means that an arrestee who 
is asked to take a breath test declines to do so 
of his own volition. Whether or not that refusal 
is conditional or reasonable makes no differ-
ence. Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 
(Utah 1986). 
A refusal to answer yes or no to a request to 
take a breath test is still a refusal. Lopez v. 
Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778 (Utah 1986). 
Plaintiff was clearly informed of the conse-
quences of her failure to submit to the blood 
alcohol content test under this section and her 
continued crying throughout the officer's re-
quests and warnings that unless she re-
sponded, he would consider that she had re-
fused and that her license could be revoked 
constituted a voluntary refusal to submit. Lee 
v. Schwendiman, 722 P.2d 766 (Utah 1986). 
Required submission to test. 
-Self-incrimination. 
The requirement that a defendant, after his 
arrest, submit to a breathalyzer test under the 
threat of losing his driver's license, does not 
deny him his constitutional protection from 
self-incrimination, since the evidence yielded 
by such testing is not of a testimonial or com-
municative nature. American Fork City v. 
Crossgrove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985). 
Failure of the officer at the time of arrest to 
read the motorist his Miranda rights did not 
invalidate the revocation of his license for fail-
ure to take the breathalyzer test, nor was his 
refusal to take the test rendered inadmissible 
in the revocation proceeding. Larson v. 
Schwendiman, 712 P.2d 244 (Utah 1985). 
A refusal to take a breathalyzer test is not 
an act compelled by the state and is thus not 
protected by the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation provided in the Utah constitution. 
Moreover, evidence of the refusal to take the 
test is admissible in evidence and does not of-
fend the privilege against self-incrimination or 
the right to due process. Sandy City v. Larson, 
733 P.2d 137 (Utah 1987). 
Right to refuse test. 
By implying consent, this section removes 
the right of a driver to lawfully refuse a test 
but cannot remove his physical power to re-
fuse. Thus, the purpose of the law is to avoid 
the violence which often attends attempts to 
forcibly test recalcitrant drivers. In re RLI, 739 
P.2d 1123 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Stay of license suspension. 
Absent a strong showing of the likelihood of 
success on the merits, the balancing of the fac-
tors to be considered in assessing an applica-
tion for a stay of a driver's license suspension 
under this section tips in favor of denying a 
stay due to important public policy implica-
tions. Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Sworn report of arresting officer. 
Where arresting officer's report concerning 
driver's refusal to submit to a chemical test for 
the presence of alcohol or drugs in the body 
was not signed in the presence of a notary, the 
report was not a sworn report as required by 
this section and the ensuing revocation of the 
driver's license was a legal nullity. Helsten v. 
Schwendiman, 668 P.2d 509 (Utah 1983). 
Driver's license revocation proceeding for 
failure of licensee to submit to breathalyzer 
test was declared a legal nullity where police 
officer did not verbally affirm or swear to the 
contents of the report, although he did sign it 
in the presence of a notary. Colman v. 
Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 29 (Utah 1984). 
Where an officer admitted at trial that a dep-
uty county clerk did not formally put him un-
der oath, but he testified that he went before 
her, raised his right hand, and swore to the 
accuracy of the report, in so doing, the officer 
affirmatively took an oath. Baker v. 
Schwendiman, 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986). 
Where a deputy county clerk signed and 
dated officer's report and affixed the seal of the 
county clerk, acting in her capacity as deputy 
court clerk, this was all that was required. 
Baker v. Schwendiman, 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 
1986). 
Trial de novo in district court. 
The trial de novo in the district court to re-
view an administrative revocation of a driver's 
license for refusal to submit to a blood test for 
alcohol content pursuant to the implied con-
sent statute is a complete retrial upon new evi-
dence with the burden of proof and the burden 
of going forward with the evidence upon the 
drivers license division. Pledger v. Cox, 626 
P.2d 415 (Utah 1981). 
W arrantless search allowed. 
Implied consent justifies warrantless 
searches under the following circumstances: (1) 
there is probable cause to believe the suspect 
was driving or in control of a motor vehicle 
while having a statutorily prohibited blood al-
cohol content; (2) the suspect was arrested; and 
(3) the method of extraction of blood was rea-
sonable. In re RLI, 739 P.2d 1123 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987). 
Cited in Moore v. Schwendiman, 76 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 10 (Ct. App. 2/17/88); Layton City v. 
Noon, 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1987); Salt Lake 
City v. Womack, 747 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1987). 
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41-6-44.20. Drinking alcoholic beverage and open con-
tainers in motor vehicle prohibited - Definitions 
- Exceptions. 
(1) A person may not drink any alcoholic beverage while operating a motor 
vehicle or while a passenger in a motor vehicle, whether the vehicle is mov-
ing, stopped, or parked on any highway. 
(2) A person may not keep, carry, possess, transport, or allow another to 
keep, carry, possess, or transport in the passenger compartment of a motor 
vehicle, when the vehicle is on any highway, any container which contains 
any alcoholic beverage if the container has been opened, its seal broken, or the 
contents of the container partially consumed. 
(3) In this section: 
(a) "Alcoholic beverage" has the meaning given in Section 32A-l-5. 
(b) "Passenger compartment" means the area of the vehicle normally 
occupied by the operator and passengers and includes areas accessible to 
them while traveling, such as a utility or glove compartment, but does not 
include a separate front or rear trunk compartment or other area of the 
vehicle not accessible to the operator or passengers while inside the vehi-
cle. 
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers in the living quarters 
of a motor home or camper. 
(5) Subsection (2) does not apply to passengers traveling in any licensed 
taxicab or bus. 
History: C. 1953, 41-6-44.20, enacted by L. 
1981, ch. 272, § 1; 1987, ch. 92, § 55; 1987, 
ch. 138, § 42. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1987 amend-
ment, by Chapter 92, corrected the statutory 
reference in Subsection (3)(b). 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 138, in 
Subsection (1) substituted "operating'' for 
"driving" and deleted "street or" preceding 
"highway"; in Subsection (3)(a) substituted 
"32A-1-5" for "32-1-3"; in Subsection (3)(b) sub-
stituted "operator" for "driver" both places it 
appears; in Subsection (4) deleted from the end 
"but the driver of the vehicle will be prohibited 
from consuming alcoholic beverages as pro-
vided in Subsection (1)"; deleted former Sub-
section (6), which read "Any person convicted 
of a violation of this section is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor"; and made changes in phrase-
ology and punctuation throughout the section. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
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office of Legislative Research and General Cross-References. Sentencing for misde-
Counsel. meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 311. 
A.L.R. - Validity of statute or ordinance 
making it an offense to consume or have alco-
holic beverages in open package in motor vehi-
cle, 57 A.L.R.3d 1071. 
41-6-44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by peace 
officers - Impound requirements - Removal of 
vehicle by owner. 
The Legislature finds that under this section it is contrary to the safety of 
the public to leave vehicles unattended on highways. 
(1) If a peace officer arrests or cites the operator of a vehicle for violat-
ing Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44:10, or a local ordinance similar to Section 
41-6-44, which complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the officer shall seize 
and impound the vehicle, except as provided under Subsection (2). 
(2) If a registered owner of the vehicle, other than the operator, is 
present at the time of arrest, the officer may release the vehicle to that 
registered owner, but only if the registered owner: 
(a) requests to remove the vehicle from the scene; 
(b) presents to the officer a valid operator's license and sufficient 
identification to prove ownership of the vehicle; 
(c) complies with all restrictions of his operator's license; and 
(d) would not, in the judgment of the officer, be in violation of 
Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to Section 
41-6-44, which complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), if permitted to 
operate the vehicle, and if the vehicle itself is legally operable. 
(3) An officer who impounds a vehicle under this section shall remove, 
or cause the vehicle to be removed, to the nearest accessible impound yard 
that meets the standards set by rule by the Motor Vehicle Division, or if 
none, to a garage or some other reasonably safe place. The impound yard 
standards set by the Motor Vehicle Division shall be equitable and rea-
sonable, and unrestrictive as to number of impound yards per geographi-
cal area. The peace officer or agency by whom the officer is employed 
shall, within 24 hours after the seizure, notify the Motor Vehicle Division 
of the seizure and impoundment. The notice shall state the operator's 
name, a description of the vehicle, its identification number, if any, its 
license number, the date, time, and place of impoundment, the reason for 
impoundment, and the name of the garage or place where the vehicle is 
stored. 
(4) Upon receipt of notice, the Motor Vehicle Division shall give notice 
to the registered owner of the vehicle in the manner prescribed by Section 
41-1-16. The notice shall: 
(a) state the date, time, and place of impoundment, the name of the 
person operating the vehicle at the time of seizure, the reason for 
seizure and impoundment, and the name of the garage or place where 
the vehicle is stored; 
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(b) state that the registered owner is responsible for payment of 
towing, impound, and storage fees charged against the vehicle; and 
(c) inform the registered owner of the vehicle of the conditions 
under Subsection (5) which shall be satisfied before the vehicle is 
released. 
(5) The impounded vehicle shall be released after the registered owner 
or the owner's agent: (a) makes a claim in person for release of the vehicle 
at any office of the State Tax Commission; (b) pays an impound fee of$25; 
(c) presents identification sufficient to prove ownership of the impounded 
vehicle; and (d) pays all towing and storage fees to the impound lot where 
the vehicle is stored. All impound fees assessed under this subsection are 
dedicated revenue to the Motor Vehicle Division. 
(6} An impounded vehicle not claimed by the registered owner or the 
owner's agent within the time prescribed by Section 41-1-117 shall be sold 
in acco:rdance with that section and the proceeds, if any, disposed of under 
Sec,tion 41.1-117. The date ofimpoundment is considered the date of sei-
zure for computing the time period provided in Section 41-l-117. 
(7) Towing and storage fees shall be established by the Motor Vehicle 
Division and shall be reviewed by the division annually to ensure equity 
for vehicle owners and towing and storage operators. Towing, impound, or 
storage fees are a lien on the vehicle. 
(8) The registered owner of the vehicle upon the payment of all fees and 
charges incurred in the seizure and impoundment of the owner's vehicle 
has a. cause of action for all the fees and charges., together with damages, 
court costs, and attorney fees, against the operator of the vehicle whose 
actions caused the impou1,1dment. 
(9} No liability may be imposed upon any peace officer, the state, or 
any, of its political subdivisions on account of the enforcement of this 
section. 
History: C, 1953, 41-6-44.30, enacted by L. 
1982 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; L. 1983, ch. 194, 
§ l; 1984, ch. 37, § 1; 1987, ch. 138, § 43. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1984 amend-
ment deleted 41-&-43 and 41-&-44.2 f:rom sec-
tions listed in S1,1bsection (1); inserted "or a lo-. 
cal ordinance similar to Section 41-6-44, which 
complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1)" in Sub-
section (l); added "except as provided under 
Subsection (2)." to Subsection (1); inserted Sub-
section (2) <1nd redesjgnated the following s,ub-
sections; substituted references tq Division of 
Motor Vehicles for references to department of 
motor vehicles throughout the section; substi-
tuted "within 24 hours" for "not later than 
three days" in the third sentence of Subsection 
(3); substituted "notify" for "cause notice of the 
seizure and impoundment to be mailed" in the 
third sentence of Subsection (3); and made 
minor changes in phra.seology and style. 
The 1987 amendment substituted "operator" 
for "driver" throughout the section; in th~ in.-
tr-oductory paragraph substituted "highways" 
for "public roads";· in S1,1bsection (1) deleted 
"category I" preceding "peace officer"; and 
made minor changes in phraseology and punc-
tuation tkroughout the section.. 
Effective Dates. - Section 2 of Laws 1984, 
ch. 37 provided: "This act shall take effect on 
July 1, 1984." 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. - Utah Legislative 
Survey - 1983,. 1984 Utah L. Rev. 115, 175. 
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41-6-45 MOTOR VEHICLES 
41-6-45. Reckless driving - Penalty. 
(1) A person who operates any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the 
safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving. 
(2) A person convicted of reckless driving is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor. Upon a first conviction, the penalty is a minimum term of imprison-
ment of not fewer than five days, or a minimum fine of not less than $25. On a 
second or subsequent conviction, the penalty is a minimum term of imprison-
ment of not fewer than ten days, or a minimum fine of not less than $50. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 35; C. 1943, 
57-7-112; L. 1978, ch. 33, § 9; 1986, ch. 178, 
§ 30; 1987, ch. 138, § 44; 1987, ch. 204, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1986 amend-
ment rewrote Subsection (2). 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 138, sub-
stituted "A person who operates" for "Any per-
son who drives" in Subsection (1) and made 
minor changes in phraseology in the second 
and third sentences of Subsection (2). 
The 1987 amendment, by Chapter 204, made 
minor changes in phraseology and punctuation 
throughout the section. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References. - Penalty for misde-
meanors, §§ 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for felonies, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-30L 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Former jeopardy. 
Conviction of motorist for reckless driving 
held not bar to subsequent prosecution for in-
voluntary manslaughter. State v. Empey, 65 
Utah 609, 239 P. 25, 44 A.L.R. 558 (1925), re-
viewed, State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 
P.2d 258 (1945). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. - 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automo-
biles and Highway Traffic § 312 et seq. 
C.J.S. - 61A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles§§ 609 
to 624. 
A.L.R. - Validity, construction, and appli-
cation of criminal statutes specifically directed 
against racing of automobiles on public streets 
or highways (drag racing), 24 A.L.R.3d 1286. 
Liability of one fleeing police for injury re-
sulting from collision of police vehicle with an-
other vehicle, person, or object, 51 A.L.R.3d 
1226. 
Statute prohibiting reckless driving: defi-
niteness and certainty, 52 A.L.R.4th 1161. 
Key Numbers. - Automobiles ~ 330. 
ARTICLE 6 
SPEED RESTRICTIONS 
41-6-46. Speed regulations- Safe and appropriate speeds 
at certain locations - Prima facie speed limits -
Emergency power of the governor. 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable 
and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and poten-
tial hazards then existing, including, but not limited to when: 
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing; 
(b) approaching and going around a curve; 
(c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway; and 
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